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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A NEW VIEWPOINT 
Janai S. Nelson

 
Abstract 
This Article engages the equality principles of the First Amendment 
and the Equal Protection Clause to reconsider the constitutionality of 
one of the last and most entrenched barriers to universal suffrage—felon 
disenfranchisement. A deeply racialized problem, felon 
disenfranchisement is additionally and independently a legislative 
judgment as to which citizen‘s ideas are worthy of inclusion in the 
electorate. Relying on a series of cases involving state interests in 
protecting the ballot and promoting its intelligent use, this Article 
demonstrates that felon disenfranchisement is open to attack under the 
Supreme Court‘s fundamental rights jurisprudence when it is motivated 
by a desire to limit political expression based on its perceived content; 
in other words, when felon disenfranchisement is motivated by 
viewpoint discrimination.  
The justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws reflect a 
misguided perception of how a voter‘s identity, status, or behavior will 
affect how he votes. This Article confronts these justifications and 
examines the linkages between the right to vote and First Amendment 
protections of freedom of speech. Recognizing the difficulty in proving 
legislative motive in electoral decisions, this Article draws upon the 
underexplored theory of First Amendment Equal Protection, as well as 
the Court‘s jurisprudence in the area of partisan gerrymandering to 
formulate the claim of viewpoint discrimination and demonstrate 
increasing judicial intolerance for legislative tampering in the electoral 
process with suspect motives. Through its viewpoint discrimination 
analysis, this Article also lays bare the multidimensional impact of felon 
disenfranchisement in terms of race, class, and partisanship, thereby 
highlighting the particular segments of society whose political 
participation and freedom of expression are most directly infringed by 
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―If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics . . . .‖—Justice Robert H. Jackson1 
INTRODUCTION 
Along the arc of right to vote challenges, felon disenfranchisement 
has proved an especially intractable form of vote denial. Despite robust 
academic and popular skepticism concerning the constitutionality of 
felon disenfranchisement laws,
2
 they persistently evade successful legal 
challenge. This is, in part, because courts routinely interpret the legal 
precedent establishing the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement 
broadly to the exclusion of other claims. In Richardson v. Ramirez,
3
 the 
Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
implicitly authorizes states to deny voting rights based on a felony 
conviction.
4
 Courts have generally relied on Ramirez to bar equal 
protection challenges to felon disenfranchisement‘s disparate impact 
and its unequal treatment of citizens with felony convictions and other 
citizens.
5 
 
                                                                                                                     
 1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (majority opinion).  
 2. See, e.g., JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20–40 (2006); Angela Behrens, Christopher 
Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the ―Menace of Negro Domination‖: Racial 
Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 
572 (2003); Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
(2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinus_Aug2012.pdf. 
More recent scholarship in this area examines the United States‘ disenfranchisement laws in 
comparative and international contexts. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, Fair Measure of the Right to 
Vote: A Comparative Perspective on Voting Rights Enforcement in a Maturing Democracy, 18 
CARDOZO J. INT‘L LAW & COMP. L. 425, 448–53 (2010); Robin L. Nunn, Lock Them Up and 
Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 763, 765–781 (2005); Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, Legal 
Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights 
Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 197, 210–38 (2011). 
 3. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 4. Id. at 56.  
 5. The validity of this holding has been roundly contested in dissenting opinions, 
including the dissenting opinions in Ramirez itself. See id. at 72–86 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
see also Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 359 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker, J., dissenting) (―[I]t is clear 
that the scope of Congress‘s enforcement authority is at its zenith when protecting against 
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However, two important developments since Ramirez challenge the 
seemingly unfettered discretion that legislatures exercise to enact and 
maintain felon disenfranchisement statutes. The first development is a 
subtle doctrinal shift that has linked the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments in the realm of political participation outside the areas of 
campaign finance and ballot access.
6
 First Amendment principles have 
increasingly surfaced in voting qualification and political restructuring 
cases since the Supreme Court decided the one person, one vote cases of 
the 1960s. More recently, the Court‘s partisan gerrymandering 
opinions—majority, concurring, and dissenting—have acknowledged 
the First Amendment‘s relevance to contemplating fairness and equality 
in the electoral process.
7
 The First Amendment, although not applied 
directly, seems to be influencing the scrutiny in such cases (some more 
than others), resulting in heightened constitutional protection in the 
electoral arena.
8 
 
The second development since Ramirez is one that predates the 
Court‘s partisan gerrymandering claims and directly limits Ramirez. 
Although Ramirez held that state felon disenfranchisement laws do not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause per se,
9
 in Hunter v. Underwood,
10
 
                                                                                                                     
discrimination based on suspect classifications (such as race), or when protecting fundamental 
rights (such as voting.‖); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that states have no 
affirmative grant of power to disenfranchise criminals under Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); id. at 1244–45, 1247, 1251 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the summary 
judgment grant on both the Equal Protection and the Voting Rights Act claims). Challenges to 
felon disenfranchisement laws brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)), have 
also proved unsuccessful. 
 6. See, e.g., John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (2005) (noting 
the Court‘s ―shift in emphasis‖ in modern speech cases toward content-based discrimination and 
an antidiscrimination principle away from the inherent value of speech); Elena Kagan, Private 
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 413, 414, 428–32 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 767, 768, 776 (2001) (arguing that First Amendment cases should be decided 
exclusively on the question of motive). 
 7. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 461–62 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
 8. This is less the case in the area of partisan gerrymandering than campaign finance and 
ballot access. See generally Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative 
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 87 (2010) (―In the campaign context . . . the very point of 
many contributions is to provide a ‗gift[] from citizens who simply wish to express their 
ideological commitment to a candidate‘s causes . . . ‘ [a]nd the First Amendment grants 
individuals the right to advance and support their political views in this way.‖ (quoting BRUCE 
ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 7 
(2002))). 
 9. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 56. 
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the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from 
disenfranchising citizens with felony convictions if the 
disenfranchisement is motivated by race.
11
 Put another way, if the 
motive to deny the right to vote is based on race, the regulation violates 
the Equal Protection Clause despite Ramirez‘s sanction of felon 
disenfranchisement. This Article applies the Hunter rationale 
prohibiting race discrimination to a theory of viewpoint discrimination 
in the enactment and maintenance of felon disenfranchisement laws. 
The principal claim is straightforward: If a state‘s motive or interest in 
denying voting rights to citizens with felony convictions is based on 
how those persons might vote, then the regulation denies those citizens 
equal protection of the laws and fails strict scrutiny. In short, an 
impermissible motive that constrains a fundamental right is 
constitutionally suspect.  
But how can the Equal Protection Clause apply to viewpoint 
discrimination, which falls squarely and traditionally within the domain 
of the First Amendment? This Article advances the under-explored 
theory of ―First Amendment Equal Protection‖12 to address the equality 
concerns in the electoral sphere that engage both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. First Amendment Equal Protection is a unique 
species of equal protection that is informed by First Amendment 
protections of free speech and expression in the political realm. By 
applying First Amendment principles, First Amendment Equal 
Protection fortifies the equal protection inquiry by (1) requiring clear 
government standards, (2) broadening justiciability of claims, (3) 
providing leniency toward facial challenges, and (4) increasing judicial 
fact-finding.
13
 These four factors distinguish First Amendment Equal 
Protection from conventional equal protection and counteract, in part, 
the Court‘s disregard of disparate impact.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays the groundwork for the 
viewpoint discrimination claim against felon disenfranchisement laws. 
In addition to defining viewpoint discrimination, Part I analyzes the 
Court‘s jurisprudence in a series of cases concerning residency 
                                                                                                                     
 10. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).  
 11. See infra note 178. In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court held that Ramirez‘s permit to 
disenfranchise did not include disenfranchisement based on intentional racial discrimination. 
471 U.S. at 233 (―[W]e are confident that [Section] 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was not 
designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination . . . which otherwise violates 
§[Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. 
Ramirez . . . suggests the contrary.‖). 
 12. Daniel P. Tokaji coined the phrase ―First Amendment Equal Protection‖ in his article, 
First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2409, 2410 (2003) [hereinafter Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection]. 
 13. Id. at 2430. 
5
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requirements and other voting qualifications that reveal a judicial theory 
of viewpoint discrimination in voting regulations. It then examines the 
justifications for felon disenfranchisement that form the basis of a 
viewpoint discrimination claim, identifying both the perceived 
viewpoint that legislatures intend to exclude and the viewpoint that is 
ultimately excised from the electoral process. Part II introduces First 
Amendment Equal Protection as a viable theory in which to couch a 
viewpoint discrimination claim. In light of the lack of precedent 
applying the First Amendment directly to voting cases and the strength 
of the Equal Protection Clause in this area, First Amendment Equal 
Protection maximizes the equality protections for the right to vote 
through the combined force of both doctrines. 
Part III considers three challenges to applying First Amendment 
Equal Protection to a viewpoint discrimination claim against felon 
disenfranchisement. First, it briefly explores the omission of First 
Amendment jurisprudence from election law and the question of 
whether voting is speech. Second, it recognizes the formidable impact 
of Ramirez in the Equal Protection context as a shield against challenges 
to felon disenfranchisement laws. Finally, using the Court‘s partisan- 
gerrymandering cases starting with Vieth v. Jubilierer, this Part unpacks 
the opinions to demonstrate that, as in excessively partisan redistricting, 
viewpoint discrimination in felon disenfranchisement poses a danger of 
excessive legislative manipulation of the political process. As evidenced 
in its political-gerrymandering jurisprudence, the Court is concerned 
about the boundaries of state influence in the electoral process. The 
concerns raised by felon disenfranchisement are not materially different.  
The Article concludes that a viewpoint discrimination-based 
challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws would not necessarily lead 
to the undoing of these pervasive regulations. Rather, such a challenge 
reveals the unconstitutionality of certain justifications for these laws 
and, in some cases, may provide a sufficient basis for repealing state 
statutes that are based on these motives.  
I.  VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND VOTING 
Despite the substantive overlap between freedom of expression and 
voting, the Court has been loath to treat voting as a right protected 
under the First Amendment. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
14
 
while deciding whether a poll tax was a constitutionally-permissible 
prerequisite to voting, the Court confronted whether the First 
Amendment applies to vote-denial claims.
15
 The Court‘s opinion 
                                                                                                                     
 14. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 15. Id. at 664–65.   
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acknowledged petitioners‘ argument that the First Amendment 
implicitly guarantees a right to vote in state elections that may not be 
conditioned upon payment of a tax or fee.
16
 However, the Court 
ultimately avoided deciding the matter on First Amendment grounds 
and instead relied on the Equal Protection Clause to strike down the 
practice.
17 
 
By evading the question of whether the First Amendment also 
applies to restrictions on voting, the Harper Court set a judicial course 
that limited vote denial claims to the Fourteenth Amendment—a course 
from which the Court has strayed very little. The Court‘s failure to 
either accept or reject a relationship between the First Amendment and 
the right to vote has resulted in a less than coherent application of the 
First Amendment in the electoral arena.
18
 Nonetheless, First 
Amendment principles have continued to percolate within voting rights 
jurisprudence. Notably, concerns of viewpoint discrimination, although 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 665 (―It is argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly 
by reason of the First Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the 
payment of a tax or fee.‖). 
 17. Id. (―We do not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression. 
For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be 
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖). 
For a compelling discussion of the associational interests and, particularly, how they relate to 
race and partisanship, see Guy-Uriel Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First 
Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1239–60 (2003) (arguing that the First 
Amendment protects the right of voters of color to associate as voters of color where race and 
political identity are correlated). 
 18. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 29, 39 (2004) (noting that ―[g]errymandering was cubbyholed as an equal 
protection problem; campaign finance, as a First Amendment problem,‖ creating ―little sense of 
an organizing principle to ‗the law of politics‘‖); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, 
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1819 (1999) (arguing 
―that First Amendment public discourse has drifted toward too high a level of abstraction and 
generality—a level that cannot make sense of the actual cases themselves‖); Tokaji, First 
Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2496 (―Harper‘s avoidance of this question has 
hindered the recognition of the links between the First Amendment and the principle of equal 
participation. Had the Court addressed the question, it might have avoided the confusion evident 
in such cases over the proper relationship between First Amendment equality and equality in 
other areas of political participation ever since.‖).  
Indeed, even in the initial development of campaign-finance and ballot-access cases where 
the First Amendment figures prominently, the Court was reluctant to acknowledge its 
application. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 445 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with the majority‘s finding that a ban on write-in voting did not implicate the First 
Amendment right to expression because, ―[a]s the majority points out, the purpose of casting, 
counting, and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for 
political expression‖); see also Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional 
Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (1985) (discussing the relevance of 
First Amendment principles to voting-rights controversies). 
7
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not labeled as such, have informed voting rights jurisprudence since the 
1800s.
19
 As explained more fully below, the viewpoint discrimination in 
these early cases involved voting qualifications based on a potential 
voter‘s suspected outlook in light of their presumed or actual beliefs.20 
Until relatively recently, restrictions that embodied such viewpoint 
discrimination were unchallenged.  
A.  Defining Viewpoint Discrimination 
Viewpoint discrimination is widely considered the most pernicious 
incursion on First Amendment rights.
21
 When Justice Robert Jackson 
announced the limits of government speech regulation in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette,
22
 he situated the concept of 
viewpoint discrimination at the apex of the hierarchy of constitutional 
protections. The Court has continued to advance this vision of the First 
Amendment by routinely castigating government regulations that ―cast 
a pall of orthodoxy‖23 or are ―aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.‖24 Other concerns involve the potential distortion viewpoint-
based restrictions can cause in the ―marketplace of ideas‖ and their 
impact on the ―thinking process of the community‖ for purposes of 
abetting democratic government.
25 
 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 35 (1885); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 
333, 346–48 (1890).  
 20. Murphy, 114 U.S at 46–47; Davis, 113 U.S. at 341, 346–47. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (―It is 
rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.‖); Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581 
(1965) (Black, J., concurring) (―[Viewpoint-based regulation is] censorship in a most odious 
form . . . .‖); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom 
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56 (2000) 
(―[V]iewpoint restrictions have never been upheld.‖); id. at 59 (―Nothing is more inconsistent 
with freedom of speech than for the government to use its awesome power to advance some 
views and suppress or disfavor others.‖); Fee, supra note 6, at 1104 (―Under current law, 
content-based speech regulations are highly disfavored and are presumptively 
unconstitutional.‖); Kagan, supra note 6, at 443–44 (―Content-based restrictions on speech—
restrictions that by their terms limit expression on the basis of what is said—usually are subject 
to far more rigorous scrutiny.‖). 
 22. 319 U.S. 624, 625, 642 (1943) (invalidating a public school compulsory flag salute 
because it impermissibly ―prescribe[d] what shall be orthodox‖ in the realm of politics, 
conscience, and ideas in violation of the First Amendment). 
 23. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967) (invalidating as vague and overbroad a New York law that mandated termination of 
public school and university teachers for any ―treasonable or seditious utterance‖). 
 24. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting Am. Commc‘n Ass‘n v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). 
 25. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 27 (1948); see also Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (―There 
 
8
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The concept of viewpoint discrimination is not grounded in the text 
of the First Amendment itself. Rather, it was created by the Court as a 
tool for distinguishing those regulations of speech or expression that 
seek to advance ―legitimate regulatory goal[s]‖26 from those that seek 
―to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public 
debate through coercion rather than persuasion.‖27 Although the Court 
has never delimited precisely what constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination,
28
 certain basic principles pervade the common 
understanding of the term. At its core, the viewpoint discrimination test 
reflects the broad concept that government cannot regulate speech based 
on its content,
29
 and regulations must be neutral as to both viewpoint 
and subject matter.
30
 Viewpoint neutrality forbids the government from 
basing regulations on the ideology of the message or by extension, the 
                                                                                                                     
is an ‗equality of status in the field of ideas‘ . . . .‖ (citing MEIKLEJOHN, supra)). There is also an 
element of self-determination coupled with broader collective democracy ideals that undergirds 
the Court‘s intolerance of viewpoint discrimination. In writing for the Court in Turner, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy explained: 
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should 
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 
consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon 
this ideal. Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or 
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, 
contravenes this essential right.  
Turner, 512 U.S. at 641 (citations omitted). 
 26. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641. 
 27. Id.; see Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 47 (1885); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333, 348 (1890). 
 28. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm‘n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) 
(concluding that preventing an independent candidate from participating in a debate is facially 
neutral); Nat‘l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998) (finding that a 
federal law that allowed the National Endowment for the Arts to consider ―decency‖ and 
―respect for values‖ was viewpoint-neutral); Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 58.  
 29. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (―[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.‖).  
 30. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 
(1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. . Comm‘n, 
447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Subject-matter neutrality refers to the unconstitutionality of the 
government regulating speech based on the topic of the speech. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 
537. ―Content‖ and ―viewpoint‖ are often used interchangeably by courts, thereby muddling the 
doctrinal development of these distinct claims. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 
829–31 (1995) (noting the imprecise ―distinction between, on the one hand, content 
discrimination, which may be permissible . . . and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, 
which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum‘s 
limitations‖). 
9
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messenger.
31 
 
The consensus among the ideologies underlying the prohibition of 
viewpoint discrimination is the fear of government regulation for 
impermissible ends.
32
 Indeed, the overarching concern with viewpoint 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984) (asking whether a law was ―designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds 
distasteful‖); Kagan, supra note 6; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227–28 (1983). In her article Private Speech, Public 
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, Associate Justice 
Elena Kagan, then a law professor at the University of Chicago Law School, defined 
impermissible government motive under the First Amendment as a form of viewpoint 
discrimination: 
First, the government may not restrict expressive activities because it disagrees 
with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker; it may not act on the 
basis of a view of what is a true (or false) belief or a right (or wrong) opinion. 
Or, to say this in a slightly different way, the government cannot count as a 
harm, which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that ideas it considers 
faulty or abhorrent enter the public dialogue and challenge the official 
understanding of acceptability or correctness. Second, though relatedly, the 
government may not restrict speech because the ideas espoused threaten 
officials‘ own self-interest—more particularly, their tenure in office. The 
government, to use the same construction as above, cannot count as a harm, 
which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that speech may promote the 
removal of incumbent officeholders through the political process. Third, and as 
a corollary to these proscriptions, the government may not privilege either ideas 
it favors or ideas advancing its self-interest—for example, by exempting certain 
ideas from a general prohibition. Justice Scalia summarized these tenets in 
R.A.V.: ―The government may not regulate (speech) based on hostility—or 
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.‖ To this statement of 
illicit motive, one further gloss must be added: the government may not limit 
speech because other citizens deem the ideas offered to be wrong or 
offensive—or for that matter, because they see the ideas as threatening to 
incumbent officials. This ban echoes those just stated, except for the identity of 
the party (above the government, now the public) that disapproves the ideas; 
the theory is that this substitution of party name should make no constitutional 
difference. . . . The key principle with respect to motive is that the government 
may not limit speech on grounds of mere disapproval, no matter whose or how 
widely shared. 
Kagan, supra note 6, at 428–30 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Justice Kagan‘s 
definition is particularly relevant to the consideration of felon disenfranchisement laws because 
of the political nature of the act of voting, its potential impact on electoral outcomes, and the 
unpopular status that citizens with felony convictions hold. 
 32. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (―[T]he ‗principal 
inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation 
of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.‘‖ (citing Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
386 (1992) (―The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.‖). 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/3
2013] FIRST AMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 121 
 
discrimination is its deleterious effect on democratic legitimacy. 
Professor James Weinstein describes the right to participate in self-
governance as a core speech norm that can be eroded by viewpoint 
discrimination‘s effect on both actual governance and individual 
perceptions of legitimacy: 
If an individual is excluded from participating in public 
discourse because the government disagrees with the 
speaker‘s views or because it finds the ideas expressed too 
disturbing or offensive, any decision taken as a result of 
that discussion would, as to such an excluded citizen, lack 
legitimacy. . . . This explains free speech doctrine‘s fierce 
opposition to viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on 
public discourse. This concern for legitimacy also explains 
why the right to participate in public discourse free of 
government-imposed content restriction is not just a 
collective interest inherent in popular sovereignty, but also 
a fundamental individual right that government may 
legitimately infringe, if at all, only in truly extraordinary 
circumstances.
33
 
Democratic legitimacy is rooted in the Court‘s concern that 
legislative ―coercion‖ through the manipulation of public debate will 
characterize our democratic structures, replacing ―persuasion‖ through 
an unfiltered exchange of ideas.
34
 The work of the viewpoint 
discrimination claim is to ensure that the legislative motive behind 
enacting or maintaining regulations does not amount to manipulation of 
the democratic process. As Professor Weinstein points out, viewpoint 
discrimination threatens both ―a collective interest inherent in popular 
sovereignty‖ and ―a fundamental individual right.‖35 The collective 
interest inherent in popular sovereignty recognizes viewpoint 
discrimination as a structural harm. Instead of limiting its impact to the 
infringement of an individual right, viewpoint discrimination is a 
broader threat to governance, legitimacy, and checks and balances. 
Indeed, viewpoint discrimination permits an evasion of the democratic 
process by permitting the state to excise unwanted voices from the body 
politic. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 33. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory 
Democracy] (footnote omitted); see also James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political 
Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 363–64 (2011). 
 34. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641. 
 35. Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 33, at 498.  
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Admittedly, the distinction between ―status‖ or ―speaker,‖ on the one 
hand, and ―viewpoint,‖ on the other, can be blurry at times. To the 
extent that the government denies a speaker freedom of speech or 
expression because of her identity, depending on the motive, the 
government may also be basing its denial on the suspected viewpoint of 
that speaker based on the speaker‘s identity. For example, one could 
argue that felon disenfranchisement is only a status-based restriction 
and does not involve anyone‘s viewpoint. This form of ―speaker 
discrimination,‖ however, is indistinguishable from other forms of 
content discrimination.
36
 Indeed, ―[w]hether speaker discrimination is 
treated as content discrimination might be framed as a question of 
governmental motive, whereby the more closely a speaker is identified 
with a particular viewpoint the more likely a decision promoting or 
disabling that speaker will be seen as an exercise of content 
discrimination.‖37 In the case of felon disenfranchisement, speaker and 
speech discrimination are two sides of the same coin. As this Article 
demonstrates, citizens with felony convictions are denied the right to 
vote because of the perceived viewpoint they would express at the polls. 
The broad exclusion of certain groups from the electoral process 
based on their perceived ideology potentially affects electoral outcomes 
and distorts the function of the democratic process. A clear example of 
this is the matter of partisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering 
is characterized by excessive manipulation of the redistricting process to 
achieve electoral advantages for a political party.
38
 When this occurs, 
the right to vote remains intact, but the voter‘s will is compromised for 
partisan gain. Although voters can cast a ballot, their will to have their 
votes aggregated in a manner that gives them a fair shot at achieving a 
desired electoral outcome is sacrificed to self-dealing legislatures. The 
result is a governance system that does not reflect the will of the people 
and thus lacks legitimacy.  
Felon disenfranchisement, when motivated by concerns about how 
voters will cast their ballots, undermines the electoral process. As 
Section I.C describes, much of the rhetoric justifying the exclusion of 
citizens with felony convictions from the electorate describes concerns 
about electoral outcomes—mafiosi electing judges—and the 
advancement of a pro-crime agenda by a menacing voting bloc. This 
outlook, ascribed to citizens with felony convictions, might be termed 
the ―criminal viewpoint.‖ Lacking empirical grounding, the criminal 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Fee, supra note 6, at 1130 (―[T]here appears to be no singular First Amendment 
approach to speaker discrimination in relation to content discrimination.‖); see also Robert Post, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 480–82 (2011). 
 37. Fee, supra note 6, at 1130. 
 38. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).  
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viewpoint is a judicial fiction based on a narrative of fear and reprisal 
that results in electoral exclusion. More importantly, even if some 
citizens with criminal convictions shared a criminal viewpoint, for 
reasons explained below, it would be unlawful to exclude them from the 
electoral process on this basis.  
B.  A Judicial Theory of Viewpoint Discrimination in Voting 
Regulations 
Evidence of the Court‘s ambivalence toward applying the First 
Amendment to voting-rights cases may be found in a body of cases that 
employs tenets of the viewpoint discrimination doctrine without 
expressly relying on the First Amendment. The Court‘s peculiar 
doctrinal evolution began with Murphy v. Ramsey
39
 in 1885. There, the 
Court upheld a congressional Act
40
 disqualifying bigamists and 
polygamists from voting in the Utah territory based on an expansive 
conception of a sovereign‘s right to regulate voting.41 Specifically, the 
Court held that conditioning voting qualifications on whether a potential 
voter is a polygamist ―is . . . for the sole purpose of determining, as in 
[the] case of every other condition attached to the right of suffrage, the 
qualification of one who alleges his right to vote.‖42 It reasoned that 
interrogating a voter‘s status as a polygamist ―is precisely similar to an 
inquiry into the fact of nativity, of age, or of any other status made 
necessary by law as a condition of the elective franchise.‖43 The Court 
further held that voting qualifications can serve as a means to ―withdraw 
all political influence from those who are practically hostile‖ to 
prevailing social values.
44
 In this way, the Court expressly permitted 
states to enact voter qualifications that were motivated by a desire to 
exclude voters deemed hostile to the status quo. In other words, the 
Court sanctioned viewpoint discrimination in voting. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 39. 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
 40. In 1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act. The Act provided that 
polygamy was a felony punishable by five years of imprisonment and a $500 fine, and that 
convicted polygamists were disenfranchised and were ineligible to hold political office. 48 
U.S.C. § 1461 (1882) (repealed 1983). 
 41. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45, 47 (justifying the restriction based on the notion that it 
protected the institution of marriage between one man and one woman as ―the sure foundation 
of all that is stable and noble in our civilization[ and] the best guaranty of that reverent morality 
which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement‖). 
 42. Id. at 43. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 45. 
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Likewise, in Davis v. Beason,
45
 the Court upheld an Idaho statute 
that required prospective voters to take an oath that they were not, 
among other things, ―a bigamist or polygamist . . . [or] a member of any 
order, organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels or 
encourages its members or devotees or any other persons to commit the 
crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law.‖46 
This time analyzing the First Amendment‘s Free Exercise Clause, the 
Court held that state legislatures have the power to prescribe any 
reasonable voter qualifications so long as those qualifications do not 
contravene enfranchising amendments to the Constitution.
47
 Here, the 
Court applied the First Amendment to a voting qualification but not as a 
matter of free expression or speech. In addition, although the practice of 
polygamy constituted a felony under both Idaho and Utah laws,
48
 
neither Davis nor Murphy involved felon disenfranchisement per se 
because the plaintiffs had not been convicted of polygamy but, rather, 
were deprived of the right to vote because of their suspected 
commission or advocacy of that crime.
49
  
Roughly half a century later, the Court rejected the reasoning in 
Murphy and Davis that permitted viewpoint discrimination.
50 
As the 
Court was entering the political thicket in one person, one vote cases 
and affirming voting as a fundamental right, the Court considered 
another set of cases involving restrictions on the right to vote based on 
how that right might be exercised. In particular, these cases centered on 
durational residency requirements and states‘ interest in shaping their 
electorates. In Carrington v. Rash, 
51 
for example, the Warren Court 
considered the State of Texas‘s argument that military personnel who 
were new residents to the state might not have sufficient local interests 
                                                                                                                     
 45. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Together, Murphy and Davis have been termed ―the Mormon 
cases.‖ Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional 
Prohibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 691, 710, 716–17 (2001). 
 46. Davis, 133 U.S. at 333 (quoting REV. ST. IDAHO §§ 501, 504). 
 47. Id. at 346. For example, the Court noted that suffrage was restricted to citizens of the 
United States above the age of twenty-one, or persons above that age who had declared their 
intention to become such citizens, and suffrage could not be denied to any citizen on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Id. 
 48. Davis, 133 U.S. at 333; Murphy, 114 U.S. at 26–30.  
 49. Davis, 133 U.S. at 334–37; Murphy, 114 U.S. at 42–44. In Murphy, the Court held 
that the plaintiffs, suspected of past practices of polygamy that were not ongoing when they 
sought to register to vote, were wrongfully and maliciously denied the right to vote. Id. at 47. 
 50. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the 
Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2004) (―[A]t least since 
Carrington v. Rash, what we might call ‗viewpoint discrimination‘ is also no longer a legitimate 
basis for disqualifying voters . . . .‖). 
 51. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
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to qualify them as voters in state elections.
52
 Rejecting this argument, 
the Court held that a state‘s ―‗[f]encing out‘ from the franchise a sector 
of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally 
impermissible.‖53 The Court‘s reasoning in Carrington reflects the basic 
underpinnings of viewpoint discrimination; however, the Court makes 
no mention of the First Amendment. 
Kramer v. Union School District,
54 
Cipriano v. City of Houma,
55
 and 
Dunn v. Blumstein
56
 further expanded this line of reasoning. Kramer 
held that voting restrictions that require residents to have a discernible 
interest in the subject matter of the election are unconstitutional.
57
 
Kramer challenged section 2012 of the New York Education Law that 
required that all voters in school district elections either own or lease 
taxable real property in the district or be parents or custodians of one or 
more children enrolled in a public school within the district.
58
 The 
plaintiff, a childless bachelor who resided, but did not own property, in 
the Union School District, challenged the voter qualification under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
59
 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that 
the state‘s justification of limiting the franchise to persons primarily 
affected by education was unconstitutional.
60 
Likewise, in Cipriano, 
decided the same day as Kramer, the Court held that provisions of 
Louisiana law restricting voting rights to property taxpayers in elections 
concerning the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility were an 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 91–94.   
 53. Id. at 94 (emphasis added); see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d 
436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc) (―[W]hen there is a 
serious risk that an election law has been passed with the intent of imposing an additional 
significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of voters, the court must apply strict 
scrutiny.‖). 
 54. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 55. 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam). 
 56. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 57. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632–33. Kramer and like cases are distinguishable from cases 
such as Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), in 
which the Court upheld a statute that limited voting for the board of directors of a water district 
to landowners, specifically apportioning votes in the elections according to the assessed 
valuation of the land. Id. at 734–35; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) 
(holding that Hawaii‘s prohibition of write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon its 
citizens‘ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). These cases are further 
distinguishable from felon disenfranchisement laws on the ground that felon disenfranchisement 
disallows voting in all elections based on felon or ex-felon status. 
 58. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622.   
 59. Id. at 624–25.  
 60. Id. at 630–33. But see id. at 636 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (reasoning that legislation 
violates the Equal Protection Clause ―only ‗if it rest[s] on grounds wholly irrelevant to 
achievement of the regulation‘s objectives‘‖ (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 
330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947))). 
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unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
61
 The Court expressly 
admonished that ―differences of opinion cannot justify excluding‖ any 
group or person from the franchise.
62
  
Three years later, in Dunn v. Blumstein,
63
 the same Court also 
rejected the argument that states have a valid interest in ensuring that 
potential voters have a ―common interest‖ in local government 
matters.
64
 In that case, the Tennessee legislature required residents to 
have lived in the state for a year and in the county for three months in 
order to be eligible to vote on the grounds that this durational residency 
requirement furthered the goal of creating a ―knowledgeable‖ electorate 
and ensuring ballot integrity.
65 
Specifically, the Tennessee legislature‘s 
stated interests were to:  
(1) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX—Protection 
against fraud through colonization and inability to identify 
persons offering to vote, and [ensure voting by a]  
(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER—Afford some surety 
that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the 
community and that as such, he has a common interest in 
all matters pertaining to its government and is, therefore, 
more likely to exercise his right more intelligently.
66 
 
The ―purity of the ballot box‖ rationale generally refers to combating 
fraudulent voting through voter impersonation, dual residency, or other 
forms of voter fraud.
67
 ―Promoting intelligent use of the ballot‖ or ―a 
knowledgeable electorate‖ in this context embodies the notion that 
newly domiciled voters can be denied the franchise because they might 
have opinions or viewpoints that differ from long-term residents.
68
 
Although the Court previously held in Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Board of Elections
69
 that states may impose rules on voting that 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1969) (per curiam). 
 62. Id. at 705. 
 63. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
 64. Id. at 354–57. 
 65. Id. at 334, 345. 
 66. Id. at 345 (citing appellants‘ brief). 
 67. Id. at 345–46. 
 68. Id. at 354–56. 
 69. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Despite the Supreme Court sanction of literacy tests in Lassiter, 
such tests have been subject to a legislative prohibition since 1970 in acknowledgment of their 
past and potential discriminatory use. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 315 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2006)) (―No citizen shall 
be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any 
Federal, State, or local election . . . .‖). The term ―test or device‖ was defined to include, in part, 
―any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting 
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are reasonably designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot,
70
 the 
Dunn Court rejected the durational residency requirement as a means of 
achieving this goal because the state‘s common interest rationale 
referred to how and what voters thought as opposed to their aptitude.
71
 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained 
that, while the state could legitimately require that voters reside in the 
geographic divisions in which they sought to vote, the durational 
residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was not necessary to achieve this goal.
72 Instead, the state‘s purported 
interest in creating a knowledgeable electorate through this method was 
a thinly veiled attempt to condition the right to vote on the viewpoints 
and opinions that might be expressed through the exercise of that 
right.
73
 Justice Marshall further warned that ―the criterion of 
‗intelligent‘ voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of abuse.‖74 Justice 
Marshall‘s concerns were shared by the 89th Congress, which enacted 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
75
 In the congressional hearings that led 
to the Act‘s passage, Congress recognized that ―in some instances 
[durational residency requirements have] the impermissible purpose or 
effect of denying citizens the right to vote . . . because of the way they 
may vote . . . .‖76  
Carrington, Kramer, Cipriano, and Dunn all limited states‘ ability to 
exclude a segment of the population from the franchise based on how 
they might vote. Although none of these cases formally overturned 
                                                                                                                     
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, [or] 
(2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject . . . .‖ 
Id.; see also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 357 n.29 (―By prohibiting various ―‗test[s]‘‖ and ―‗device[s]‘‖ 
that would clearly assure knowledgeability on the part of voters in local elections, Congress 
declared federal policy that people should be allowed to vote even if they were not well 
informed about the issues.‖ (alterations in original)). 
 70. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53–54. 
 71. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355 (citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 
(1969) (per curiam)). 
 72. Id. at 343–54; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, et seq., 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973aa-1(a)(2) (2006) (citing a congressional finding that a durational residence requirement 
―‗denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement 
across State lines‘‖). Justice Marshall further suggested that in order for the state to rationally 
promote intelligent use of the ballot through restrictive-voter qualifications, there must be 
evidence of the state‘s universal efforts to further this interest through less restrictive means. In 
the case of Tennessee, he counseled that efforts had never been made to advance this interest 
through less constricting ways. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 358–59. See infra notes 124–27 and 
accompanying text for further discussion. 
 73. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)). 
 74. Id. at 356. 
 75. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (1970).  
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(a)(4) (1970).  
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Murphy and Davis, the Court‘s subsequent opinion in Romer v. Evans77 
effectively eviscerated any precedential value they might have on this 
question, and it repudiated the notion that voting can be permissibly 
restricted based on viewpoint:  
To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain 
practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer 
good law. To the extent it held that the groups designated in 
the statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of 
their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving 
strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome.
78
 
In separately considering discrimination based on status, the Romer 
Court exempted the practice of felon disenfranchisement, citing 
Richardson v. Ramirez.
79
 Importantly, however, the Court did not 
foreclose a viewpoint challenge to felon disenfranchisement and, in fact, 
created an opening for a viewpoint discrimination claim in this context 
by citing Brandenburg v. Ohio
80
 to support its holding that the 
viewpoint discrimination once sanctioned in Davis was no longer good 
law.
81 
Accordingly, to the extent that felon disenfranchisement laws are 
motivated by impermissible viewpoint discrimination, an equal 
protection challenge that is not based on felon status but rather on 
viewpoint discrimination is viable. Indeed, as Hunter v. Underwood 
permits challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws when motivated by 
intentional discrimination,
82
 so do Romer and the line of cases 
extending from Carrington permit challenges to felon 
                                                                                                                     
 77. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that legislation that denied anti-discrimination 
protection to homosexuals is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).  
 78. Id. at 634 (citation omitted); see also id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[I]nsofar 
as Beason permits the imposition of adverse consequences based upon mere advocacy, it has 
been overruled by subsequent cases . . . .‖); Karlan, supra note 50, at 1152 (―The repudiation of 
Davis means that denying individuals the right to vote either because they endorse criminal 
behavior or because they would vote to change existing criminal laws is constitutionally 
impermissible.‖ (footnote omitted)); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised 
Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 105 (2005) (―[T]he 
majority in Romer v. Evans specifically repudiated Beason (and, by implication, 
Murphy) . . . .‖). 
 79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (stating that the practice of felon disenfranchisement ―is not 
implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable‖ (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 
(1974))); see also id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[I]nsofar as Beason holds that convicted 
felons may be denied the right to vote, it remains good law.‖). 
 80. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects inflammatory 
speech, including the advocacy of violence, unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite 
―imminent lawless action‖). 
 81. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. 
 82. 471 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1985).  
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disenfranchisement laws that are motivated by viewpoint 
discrimination.
83
 Although the Court has not expressly applied the First 
Amendment in voting rights cases, these cases demonstrate that the 
Court has employed the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
C.  Viewpoint Discrimination Justifications for Felon 
Disenfranchisement 
Out of all the justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws, the 
justifications that are generally proffered in legislative history, historical 
accounts of their enactment, and judicial opinions reveal three 
prominent themes: (1) purity of the ballot box or ―ballot integrity,‖ (2) 
intelligent use of the ballot, and (3) social contract theory. Each of these 
justifications rests on viewpoint discrimination to varying degrees and 
represents legislative justifications that do not comport with the judicial 
theory of viewpoint discrimination outlined above. In addition, as 
described further in Section III.C, these justifications abet a structural 
harm that the Court has been increasingly unwilling to countenance in 
other electoral contexts—namely, partisan gerrymandering.  
1.  Ballot integrity, Purity of the Ballot Box, Subversive Voting, and 
Other Viewpoint-Laced Morality Arguments  
The most prevalent justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws 
assume that citizens with felony convictions have an unfavorable 
viewpoint that will be expressed through the ballot. These theories are 
framed in terms such as purity of the ballot box, ballot integrity, and 
―subversive voting.‖ They each share the premise that citizens with 
felony convictions ―lack the moral judgment to vote responsibly.‖84 
Also termed the ―internal instrumental reason,‖85 this judgment 
concerns the potential corruption of the electoral process by the 
presumed transgressive views of citizens convicted of a felony.
86 
The 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See infra Section III.B. 
 84. Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 736 (2006) (―The ‗purity of the ballot 
box‘ theory relies on the outdated and illegal policy of state exclusion from voting rights for 
citizens who lack certain qualities of mind or character.‖ (citing Karlan, supra note 50, at 1158–
60)).  
 85. PERCEY LEHNING & ALBERT WEALE, CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN THE 
NEW EUROPE 19 (1997). 
 86. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d. Cir. 1967) (pointing 
out that the ―contention that the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause requires New York to allow 
convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit but as 
obviously so as anything can be‖).  
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internal instrumental reason also embodies a judgment of the moral 
capacity of persons with criminal convictions to vote. Followed to its 
logical conclusion, this argument supports the most extreme strand of 
these rationales—subversive voting.  
The theory of subversive voting perceives citizens with felony 
convictions as having the intention and ability to form a political lobby 
that will seek to enforce a pro-crime, anti-law enforcement agenda, 
ultimately threatening public safety.
87
 The concern of preventing 
subversive voting and the related concerns of ballot integrity and purity 
of the ballot box have been expressed most forcefully by the judiciary in 
scrutinizing the constitutionality of these laws. Beginning with the 
earliest felon disenfranchisement case, Washington v. State,
88
 courts 
reinforced theories of viewpoint discrimination as permissible 
motivations for the enactment and maintenance of felon 
disenfranchisement laws. In 1884, the Alabama Supreme Court in 
Washington stated:  
The manifest purpose [of felon disenfranchisement laws] is 
to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only 
sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs 
protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much 
as against that of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. . . . The 
presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction 
of felony, or other base offense indicative of great moral 
turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to 
hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are 
clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It 
is proper, therefore, that this class should be denied a right, 
the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the welfare 
of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in 
close political contests.
89 
 
By highlighting the potential impact of felon disenfranchisement on 
electoral outcomes, the court revealed its intent to permit these laws for 
the purpose of denying the franchise to citizens because of how their 
viewpoints may inform the exercise of that right and how, in turn, the 
exercise of that right might affect governance. Nearly a century later, 
and eight years before Ramirez, in Otsuka v. Hite,
90
 the state appellate 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See Susan E. Marquardt, Comment, Deprivation of a Felon’s Right to Vote: 
Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Disenfranchisement 
Law, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 279, 285–86 (2005). 
 88. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).   
 89. Id. at 585. 
 90. 414 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1966). 
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court in California commented on the above-quoted reasoning in 
Washington and concluded that felon voting would lead to voter fraud 
and potentially dilute the voting power of other citizens.
91
 Specifically, 
the court stated of Washington: 
In this passage lies a frank recognition of at least one 
tenable ground for depriving a former criminal of the vote: 
i.e., the fact that such person committed a crime is evidence 
that he was morally ‗corrupt‘ at the time he did so; if still 
morally corrupt when given the opportunity to vote in an 
election, he might defile ‗the purity of the ballot box‘ by 
selling or bartering his vote or otherwise engaging in 
election fraud; and such activity might affect the outcome 
of the election and thus frustrate the freely expressed will 
of the remainder of the voters, ‗at least in close political 
contests.‘ . . . Avoidance of such a danger, when present, is 
an adequately compelling state interest to justify an 
appropriate restriction on the right to vote.
92 
  
The Otsuka plaintiffs were denied the right to vote under California‘s 
felon disenfranchisement statute because they had pled guilty to a 
violation of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 as 
conscientious objectors to World War II.
93
 The court held that this 
crime was not ―infamous‖ per the statute and thus could not provide a 
basis for disenfranchisement.
94
 Rejecting plaintiffs‘ argument that 
California‘s felon disenfranchisement scheme was premised on a 
punishment rationale, the court found that ―[c]oupled as it is with an 
exclusion in cases of minors, idiots, insane persons, and those unable to 
read the Constitution and write their names, the category of persons 
convicted of an ‗infamous crime‘ appears rather to be an attempt to 
describe a nonpenal qualification of Fitness for voting.‖95 The court 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 417. To the extent that felon disenfranchisement laws are concerned with 
limiting the relative voice of citizens with criminal convictions vis-à-vis other citizens, they run 
curiously afoul of the Court‘s longstanding campaign-finance jurisprudence that eschews an 
equalization approach. In passages central to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), 
the Court famously held that ―equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections‖ was not a constitutionally permissible purpose and that ―the 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.‖ Id. at 48–49. 
 92. Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 417. 
 93. Id. at 414–15.   
 94. Id. at 425 (―[I]t cannot reasonably be said that plaintiffs‘ violation of the Selective 
Service Act branded them as morally corrupt and dishonest men convicted of an ‗infamous 
crime‘ as that phrase is used in article II, section 1, of the California Constitution.‖).  
 95. Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
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distinguished felon disenfranchisement further, however, by reasoning 
that:  
[M]inors, mental defectives, and illiterates are deemed unfit 
to vote because they are lacking in the minimal 
understanding and judgment necessary to exercise the 
franchise. A different rationale must be invoked for 
excluding without distinction all persons who have ever 
been convicted of ‗infamous crimes,‘ including those who 
possess the requisite mental and educational 
qualifications.‖96  
To preserve the constitutionality of the statute, though, the court 
concluded that disenfranchisement ―must be limited to conviction of 
crimes involving moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding 
their perpetrator as a threat to the integrity of the elective process.‖97  
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
Texas‘s felon disenfranchisement scheme on the grounds that citizens 
with felony convictions, ―like insane persons, have raised questions 
about their ability to vote responsibly.‖98 Those ideas also surfaced in 
Ramirez and its doctrinal precursor, Green v. Board of Elections of New 
York. The challenge in Green was brought by one of the defendants 
convicted of conspiring ―to organize the Communist Party as a group to 
teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the [United States] 
government by force and violence, and to advocate and teach the duty 
and necessity of‖ the same in the well-known case of United States v. 
Dennis.
99
 Gilbert Green unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality 
of New York‘s felon disenfranchisement laws as applied to him.100 In 
defending the laws as a general matter, the Second Circuit forcefully 
articulated a subversive-voting rationale:  
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to 
decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part 
in electing the legislators who make the laws, the 
executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try 
them for further violations, or the judges who are to 
consider their cases. This is especially so when account is 
taken of the heavy incidence of recidivism and prevalence 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 414. 
 98. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 99. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 447 (2d. Cir. 1967) (citing United 
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). 
 100. Id. at 452.   
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of organized crime. A contention that the [Constitution] 
requires [a state] to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for 
district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit 
but as obviously so as anything can be.
101
 
Furthermore, Justice Marshall‘s dissent in Ramirez further exposes the 
fear of subversive voting that underlies the justifications for felon 
disenfranchisement statutes. Justice Marshall surmised that the 
California statute at issue resulted from a concern that the ―likely voting 
pattern [of citizens with criminal convictions who had completed their 
sentences] might be subversive of the interests of an orderly society.‖102  
Although claims of subversive voting, purity of the ballot box, and 
ballot integrity may have intuitive appeal as a matter of civic 
republicanism, the censorial nature of these justifications is evident. 
Under the civic republican rationale, ―former criminals lose the right to 
participate because they have shown themselves to lack the virtue on 
which the survival of the polis depends. ‗Fitness‘ and ‗capability‘ are 
central to this justification [because] political competence, according to 
republican theory, has a moral dimension.‖103 Because voting is a right 
as well as a public duty, citizens may forfeit the right to vote if they 
become unfit in the eyes of society to perform this civic function. 
Citizens with criminal convictions are excluded because they are 
deemed unable to cast their ballots in accordance with the common 
good.
104 
This rationale is, in effect, a judgment of the propriety of the 
voter‘s thoughts and character based on the criminal conviction.105 At 
bottom, the felony conviction serves as a proxy for unpopular or 
counter-majoritarian viewpoints, which in turn operate as the basis for 
denying the franchise. The theoretical justification for 
disenfranchisement, thus, is that ―only the virtuous are morally 
competent to participate in governing society.‖106  
 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 451–52 (citation omitted). 
 102. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added) (citing Green, 380 F.2d at 451).  
 103. Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and ―The 
Purity of the Ballot Box,‖ 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1307 (1989). 
 104. See id. at 1301 (arguing that ―disenfranchisement is driven . . . by an atavistic and 
deep-rooted social need to define the boundaries of the community by stigmatizing some 
persons as outsiders‖). 
 105. Id. at 1307 (―[I]n contrast to the liberal justification, which emphasizes an ex-
offender‘s voluntary violation of the social contract, the republican justification for 
disenfranchisement rests not upon what a criminal has done, but upon whom he has shown 
himself to be.‖). 
 106. See id. at 1304. 
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Voting restrictions based on character or competence not only run 
afoul of the Voting Rights Act‘s ban on ―literacy‖ and ―character‖ tests 
and similar devices—they are a direct affront to First Amendment 
principles surrounding equality of ideas and equality of speakers.
107
 
Although the Otsuka court protested that the arguments underlying the 
theory of subversive voting ―are not fanciful fears,‖108 the available 
empirical data suggest that these concerns are indeed illusory. As 
Justice Marshall instructed in his dissent in Ramirez, ―[t]here is 
certainly no basis for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in 
the democratic process than any other citizen. Like everyone else, their 
daily lives are deeply affected and changed by the decisions of 
government.‖109 Moreover, to the extent that citizens with felony 
convictions vote differently than other citizens, that distinctive 
viewpoint counsels toward their inclusion.
110 
 
The rhetorical counterargument conjures images of rapists, 
murderers, and robbers corrupting the ballot box. Underlying these 
fears, however, are many facts that cut against blanket 
disenfranchisement for felony convictions. If the underlying purpose of 
a felon disenfranchisement statute is purity of the ballot box, then ―the 
inquiry must focus more precisely on the nature of the crime itself, and 
determine whether the elements of the crime are such that he who has 
committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the 
integrity of the elective process.‖111 If ballot integrity means the 
prevention of election fraud, a more rational proposal is to prohibit the 
one percent of inmates incarcerated for election fraud from voting for 
fear of their propensity to repeat the offense.
112
 Indeed, felon 
                                                                                                                     
 107. The Court has also called into question the propriety of relying on morality as a 
legislative motive. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (explicitly rejecting 
determinations of morality as a legitimate state interest in supporting legislation). 
 108. Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966).  
 109. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Alec 
Ewald, Punishing at the Polls: The Case Against Disenfranchising Citizens with Felony 
Convictions, DEMOS 33 (Sept. 2003), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/demos/punishing_at 
_the_polls.pdf (citing research that found that the overwhelming number of persons with felony 
convictions ―believed that they had done something ‗wrong,‘ that the law they violated 
represented a norm that was worthy of respect and that ought to be followed,‖ and that striking 
down the laws under which they were convicted would be ―a bad thing‖ because the illegal 
behavior the laws prevented would proliferate); Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: 
The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
15 (Oct. 1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd_losingthevote.pdf (―There is 
no reason to believe that all or even most ex-offenders would vote to weaken the content or 
administration of criminal laws.‖). 
 110. See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.  
 111. Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 422. 
 112. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mark E. Thompson, Comment, 
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disenfranchisement laws are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass 
constitutional scrutiny based on these rationales. As one scholar has 
noted, ―[i]f felon disenfranchisement laws are meant to prevent electoral 
fraud, then they are overinclusive [because] they apply across the board 
though the vast majority of crimes leading to disenfranchisement are not 
related to elections.‖113  
Finally, like other assumptions that underlie felon 
disenfranchisement practices, the theory of subversive voting lacks 
empirical support and defies common understanding of electoral 
behavior. The notion that, if permitted to vote, citizens with felony 
convictions might form a criminal-minded faction and influence 
criminal justice policies is not only logically unsound and factually 
misplaced; it is an impermissible and wholly undemocratic basis for 
vote denial because it excludes citizens from the electorate because of 
their unpopular views.
114
 The First Amendment Equal Protection 
approach regards these censorial justifications with suspicion and 
requires heightened scrutiny because of the First Amendment equality 
norms involved. That approach ensures that the animus for denying the 
franchise to citizens with felony convictions is not how their vote might 
affect and inform broader public policy because of its content.
115 
 
                                                                                                                     
Don’t Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of 
Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL. L. REV. 167, 191–92 (2002) 
(commenting on the illogical nexus between the commission of a felony and the propensity to 
commit an election offense); see also Lori Minnite & David Callahan, Securing the Vote: An 
Analysis of Election Fraud, MICHIGAN ELECTION REFORM ALLIANCE 4, 17 (2003), 
http://www.michiganelectionreformalliance.org/EDR_Securing_the_Vote.pdf (finding that no 
significant threat of voting fraud exists).  
 113. Figler, supra note 84, at 736 (noting that felon disenfranchisement laws are ―also, 
ironically, underinclusive, as some states classify election fraud as a misdemeanor and thus do 
not disenfranchise the people who do break voting laws‖); see also Tanya Dugree-Pearson, 
Disenfranchisement—A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish 
the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 359, 386 (2002); Eric J. Miller, Foundering 
Democracy: Felony Disenfranchisement in the American Tradition of Voter Exclusion, 19 
NAT‘L BLACK L.J. 32, 37 (2005) (―It bucks common sense, however, to argue that the ballots of 
felons or former felons have a different electoral significance than those of misdemeanant[s] or 
citizens with no criminal record.‖); Ewald, supra note 109, at 36. 
 114. See Michael Dorf, Should Felons Vote?, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:00 AM) 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/should-felons-vote.html (―[I]f people who want to eliminate 
the criminal law so that they can commit violent crimes form a near-majority of the population, 
then civilized society is already a lost cause.‖). 
 115. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 358 (1993) (―[I]t 
appears that denying ex-felons the right to vote might indeed be based on mistrust of how they 
may vote, thus a retreat from the Court‘s quasi-content neutrality.‖).  
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2.  Intelligent Use of the Ballot 
The justification of intelligent use of the ballot relates closely to 
many of the assumptions underlying subversive voting, purity of the 
ballot box, and ballot integrity. However, this theory is distinct from 
these other concepts both conceptually and in terms of the judicial 
treatment it has received. Conceptually, intelligent use of the ballot is 
distinguishable from morality-based arguments because it relates to 
ability and capacity rather than judgment and moral fitness. In terms of 
its judicial treatment, intelligent use of the ballot has historically faced 
challenges before the courts and legislature because it often disguises 
less lawful motives.
116
  
In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,
117
 the Court 
first established that competence measures were a legitimate means of 
ensuring intelligent use of the ballot and determining entitlement to the 
constitutionally protected right to vote.
118
 The State of North Carolina 
asserted its interest in ensuring that all voters are intelligent and 
informed about current political issues by requiring a literacy test.
119
 On 
this basis, the Court held that literacy tests were a constitutionally 
permissible means of achieving the end of an informed electorate.
120
  
Literacy tests admittedly bear a rational relationship to the interest in 
intelligent use of the ballot. The Harper Court explained the rationale 
behind restrictions based on this interest as follows: ―[U]nlike a poll tax, 
the ‗ability to read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed 
to promote intelligent use of the ballot.‘‖121 By contrast, the commission 
of (or failure to commit) a crime does not rationally relate to intelligent 
use of the ballot, unless the underlying concern is the perspective that 
such voters will bring to the ballot. Unlike mental capacity and age 
qualifications, felon disenfranchisement laws are not about ability or 
competence, but rather are premised on concerns about the qualitative 
                                                                                                                     
 116. As noted above, Congress imposed a nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar 
devices because they were misused as a tool of racial discrimination. See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
 117. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 118. Id. at 51–53. 
 119. Id. at 46–47, 51–52. 
 120. Id. at 53–54. The notion of intelligent use of the ballot raises concerns independent of 
its justification for felon disenfranchisement. As a general matter, it views voting and the 
function of voting as highly contested and devoid of expressive value. See Winkler, supra note 
115, at 347–48 (arguing that the Court‘s acceptance of literacy tests reflects ―an instrumental 
power approach to the right to vote: if voting is valuable only to the extent that one can use it to 
further one‘s narrow, informed policy choices, then governments might reasonably limit the 
franchise to people with sufficient ability to inform themselves of the issues‖). 
 121. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51). 
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use of the ballot based on the identity of the potential voter. The identity 
of citizens with felony convictions is a proxy to limit exercise of the 
franchise on grounds that they cannot make intelligent use of the ballot 
absent any correlation between their status as felons and the ability to 
use the ballot intelligently.
122 
Indeed, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court 
carefully deconstructed the rationale behind intelligent use of the ballot 
and noted its potential for abuse in this way.
123
  
Dunn involved a Tennessee law that required a one-year residence in 
the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for 
voting.
124
 In determining that there was no practical reason for limiting 
the franchise to longer-term residents, the Court noted that recent 
migrants to the state who take the time to register and vote shortly after 
moving are likely to be citizens ―who make it a point to be informed 
and knowledgeable about the issues.‖125 Moreover, the Court noted that 
modern communications technology and increased campaign activity 
immediately before elections provided ample opportunities for voter 
education.
126
 The Court‘s fact-finding into the context of Tennessee‘s 
residency requirement revealed that it was not narrowly tailored:  
Tennessee has never made an attempt to further its alleged 
interest in an informed electorate in a universally applicable 
way. Knowledge or competence has never been a criterion 
for participation in Tennessee‘s electoral process for 
longtime residents. Indeed, the State specifically provides 
for voting by various types of absentee persons. These 
provisions permit many longtime residents who leave the 
county or State to participate in a constituency in which 
they have only the slightest political interest, and from 
whose political debates they are likely to be cut off. That 
the State specifically permits such voting is not consistent 
with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent, informed 
use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure intelligent use 
of the ballot, it may not try to serve this interest only with 
                                                                                                                     
 122. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–32 (1985) (noting the state‘s intention 
to exclude poor whites from the franchise). 
 123. 405 U.S. 330, 35460 (1972).   
 124. Id. at 331, 334.  
 125. Id. at 358. 
 126. Id. The Court further dismissed the state‘s rationale in stating that ―the State cannot 
seriously maintain that it is ‗necessary‘ to reside for a year in the State and three months in the 
county in order to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or even purely local elections.‖ 
Id.  
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respect to new arrivals.
127
 
Similarly, if intelligent use of the ballot is the justification for felon 
disenfranchisement laws, there are better ways of serving that interest. 
Currently, no state employs any tests to determine voters‘ ability to use 
the ballot intelligently. Moreover, the felony convictions that provide 
the basis for disenfranchisement do not reveal any information about 
individual capacity to use the ballot intelligently. Nearly all citizens 
with felony convictions, including those who are incarcerated, have 
access to communications and information that would allow them to 
form part of an informed electorate. As the Court stated in Dunn, if the 
state seeks to assure intelligent use of the ballot, it may not try to serve 
this interest only with respect to a certain group of citizens.
128
 
Moreover, to justify such broad exclusion—especially as it concerns the 
protected sphere of elections—states must offer a better rationale to 
comport with First Amendment principles than Ramirez‘s implicit 
authorization to disenfranchise. 
3.  Social Contract Theory 
Like purity of the ballot box and intelligent use justifications, social 
contract theory is a popular rationale for felon disenfranchisement.
129
 
Originated by Thomas Hobbes, social contract theory presupposes that 
―a man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his 
own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the 
right to participate in further administering the [social] compact.‖130 In 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 358–59 (footnote omitted). 
 128. Id. at 359. 
 129. In Green v. Board of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (1967), Judge Henry 
Friendly cited John Locke‘s social contract theory as a justification for felon 
disenfranchisement. Id. at 451. 
 130. Id. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 
Publ‘g Co. 1994) (1651) (―The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to 
defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another . . . is to confer all 
their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, which is as much to say, 
to appoint one man or assembly of men to be their person, and every one to acknowledge 
himself to the be the author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act . . . .‖); JOHN 
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52–53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ‘g 
Co. 1980) (1690) (―And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic 
under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to everyone of that society, to submit 
to the determination of the majority . . . or else this original compact, whereby he with others 
incorporates into one society, would . . . be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties 
than . . . in the state of nature.‖); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 60–61 
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (describing the social contract as 
consisting of the ―unconditional‖ and ―total alienation‖ of each individual‘s rights to the ―whole 
community‖) (―Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, [the] 
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other words, each citizen has a tacit agreement with her government to 
be governed in exchange for the protections of government and the rule 
of law. John Locke later expanded the theory to include notions of 
deterrence, explaining that ―each transgression may be punished to that 
degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill 
bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from 
doing the like.‖131 
The social contract justification for felon disenfranchisement can be 
termed the ―expressive function of exclusion.‖132 This theory casts laws 
that deny voting rights based on criminal conviction as a form of 
punishment and stigma against those who have transgressed the laws of 
society.
133
 This punitive notion of ―just deserts‖ undermines the 
democratic enterprise, however, by failing to engage those citizens who 
are unable or unwilling to abide by the social contract that binds them to 
their government and reinforces the government‘s legitimacy. As a 
matter of viewpoint discrimination, social contract theory shuns from 
the electorate those individuals who may not subscribe to the compact 
with government that social contract theory assumes. For example, 
citizens with felony convictions are effectively denied the right to vote 
because of their ―dissent‖ from established laws. While this may not be 
an outlook that many believe society should value, it should not form 
the basis of political exclusion because it is a judgment on the viewpoint 
of the potential voter. Moreover, through the enactment and 
maintenance of felon disenfranchisement laws intended to exclude a 
criminal viewpoint, legislatures intentionally construct an electorate that 
it believes is more likely to align with state interests. 
Admittedly, of the justifications proffered in defense of felon 
disenfranchisement, social contract theory is the most ambiguous and 
difficult to link to viewpoint discrimination. Perhaps the most powerful 
critique of social contract theory (and the related, historically rooted 
concepts of infamia and civil death by which criminals were deemed 
dead and stripped of citizenship for purposes of civil rights) is that it is 
                                                                                                                     
act of association creates an artificial and corporate body composed of as many members as 
there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common 
ego, its life and its will.‖).  
 131. LOCKE, supra note 130, at 12.  
 132. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, TEACHER‘S 
MANUAL FOR THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 23 (3d ed. 
2003); see also Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 426 n. 141 
(2011); Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 91–92 (2006).  
 133. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 89 (Ernest 
Barker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1690).  
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outmoded and inconsonant with modern concepts of democracy. 
Indeed, these theories have never been reconciled with equally 
fundamental and constitutionally based norms of freedom of 
expression
134
 or with modern notions of citizenship.
135
 
As noted above, this coerced construction of the electorate 
delegitimizes the government that results.
136
 Moreover, in the effort to 
exclude a criminal viewpoint, another potential viewpoint, which I term 
the ―canary viewpoint,‖ is excised from the body politic. The canary 
viewpoint refers to the miner‘s canary whose death signals atmospheric 
dangers in the mine.
137
 In the context of felon disenfranchisement, the 
canary viewpoint results from the intersectionality of race, crime, and 
low socioeconomic status that combine to create the disenfranchised 
population.
138 
Random and disparate breaches of the social contract 
would suggest individual choice rather than systemic group-based 
causes produce this phenomenon.
139 
However, if certain discrete and 
concentrated segments of society persistently fail to meet the terms of 
the social contract, as the high incarceration rates in the United States 
and underlying demographics suggest, this is a signal that there may be 
a systemic flaw contributing to this skewed result. If, by contrast, these 
failures occurred nearly equally across all segments of society, there 
would be less cause for concern. 
The canary viewpoint expressed through the electoral process could 
signal these atmospheric dangers in our democracy. Instead, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225, 233 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) 
(summarizing this theory‘s underlying premise) (―Freedom of expression is properly based on 
autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal 
sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the 
like liberties of all others.‖); Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2427. 
 135. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) (―Citizenship is not a license that 
expires upon misbehavior.‖). 
 136. See supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text. 
 137. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER‘S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 12 (2002) (―One might say that the canary is 
diagnostic, signaling the need for more systemic critique.‖). 
 138. See Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisonser 
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003) (―The reality that 
prisoners may have an impact on the outcome of elections is an argument in favour of allowing 
them to vote rather than against it.‖); see also infra Subsection II.D.2.  
 139. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (―Felons are not 
disenfranchised based on any immutable characteristic, such as race, but on their conscious 
decision to commit an act for which they assume the risks of detection and punishment.‖). But 
see Note, supra note 103, at 1311 (―To drape disenfranchisement in the language of the social 
contract, for example, suggests that the criminal has deliberately chosen to reject and remove 
himself from the community. This understanding has two components: first, that criminality is 
the product of free choice, and second, that the criminal does not wish to be one of us.‖). 
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these potential voters are denied the right to vote in order to suppress a 
supposed criminal viewpoint. Without the benefit of the political 
participation of those citizens who have failed to uphold the social 
contract, it is more difficult to understand or attract sustained attention 
to the root causes of its breach. As a result, democracy functions by 
silencing those who might signal its failure. Democratic deliberation is 
sanitized and truncated because evidence of societal failure is excluded 
from the ballot box. While the collateral exclusion of the canary 
viewpoint may not be justiciable, the intentional exclusion of the 
perceived criminal viewpoint offends First Amendment and equal 
protection principles and can be addressed. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Having set forth the theory of viewpoint discrimination in voting and 
with respect to felon disenfranchisement laws in particular, this Part 
considers how courts might engage a legal claim on this basis. This 
Section introduces the theory of First Amendment Equal Protection as a 
way to frame and adjudicate a viewpoint discrimination claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause. First Amendment Equal Protection examines 
the exercise of discretion by official and quasi-official decision makers 
in areas where equal protection and freedom of expression may be 
compromised. To date, the skepticism that the Court has had toward 
excessive discretion in the area of political expression has not informed 
courts‘ analysis of felon disenfranchisement laws or other vote denial 
mechanisms. The logic behind First Amendment Equal Protection, 
however, should influence the legislatures‘ discretion in enacting and 
enforcing felon disenfranchisement laws and the freedom of expression 
that is consequently burdened. Moreover, the growing palatability of 
free speech protection in the political arena invites renewed 
consideration of felon disenfranchisement laws, and other vote denial 
mechanisms, within this context. 
A.  What Is First Amendment Equal Protection? 
First Amendment Equal Protection addresses discretionary 
incursions on freedom of expression that violate both clauses‘ norms of 
equality.
140
 At its core, First Amendment Equal Protection enforces the 
ideal ―that all citizens should have an equal opportunity to participate in 
                                                                                                                     
 140. As Professor Kenneth Karst has observed, ―the principle of equal liberty lies at the 
heart of the first amendment‘s protections against government regulation of the content of 
speech.‖ Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 20, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Karst, Equality in the First Amendment]. 
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public discourse.‖141 First Amendment Equal Protection is largely 
concerned with abuse of discretion by official and unofficial decision 
makers that results in a violation of equality norms.
142
 In practice, First 
Amendment Equal Protection requires courts to be equally intolerant of 
discretion in the realm of political participation as they are in the realm 
of freedom of expression, based upon the suspicion that discretion can 
mask intentional discrimination. In this regard, First Amendment Equal 
Protection allows courts to undertake a more robust analysis to 
determine whether discriminatory motives are at play.
143 
 
Rather than treat constitutional doctrines as hermetically sealed from 
one another, the Supreme Court has invited—and in some instances 
unwittingly instigated—the cross-pollination of legal theories and 
doctrines. First Amendment Equal Protection is one such example. First 
Amendment Equal Protection is a theory founded on the First 
Amendment and equal protection doctrines‘ coherence in protecting 
against discretionary incursions on freedom of expression that violate 
norms of equality. To be clear, First Amendment Equal Protection is not 
a First Amendment claim. Rather, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
First Amendment Equal Protection is a discrete dimension of equal 
protection jurisprudence informed by First Amendment principles.
144
 It 
describes the Court‘s treatment of official discretion under the Equal 
Protection Clause on matters involving speech or expression.
 
First 
Amendment Equal Protection does not expand the First Amendment‘s 
scope; instead, it enlarges the qualitative considerations for enforcing 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The phrase ―First Amendment Equal Protection‖, coined by 
Professor Daniel Tokaji, echoes Professor Henry Monaghan‘s theory of 
―First Amendment Due Process.‖145 First Amendment Due Process 
refers to the Supreme Court‘s development of distinct procedural 
safeguards to protect freedom of expression and is distinguishable from 
First Amendment Equal Protection by the latter‘s focus on the 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2410. 
 142. See id. at 2414–21. 
 143. Notably, First Amendment Equal Protection as it applies to felon disenfranchisement 
is not predicated upon including the right to vote within the ambit of First Amendment 
protections. See id. at 2498 (―Acceptance of the First Amendment Equal Protection approach to 
political equality does not require belief that the vote itself falls within the scope of the First 
Amendment.‖). 
 144. Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 960 n.85 
(2007). 
 145. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2410 n.7 (―The use 
of [First Amendment Equal Protection] is meant to recall Professor Monaghan‘s use of the term 
First Amendment ‗Due Process‘ in his article of the same title.‖ (citing Henry P. Monaghan, 
First Amendment ―Due Process,‖ 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970))). 
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substantive equality principle of the First Amendment. First 
Amendment Due Process differs further because it involves actual First 
Amendment claims, whereas First Amendment Equal Protection 
operates as a dimension of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The theories share, however, the overarching principle that 
political speech or expression requires heightened judicial protection.
146 
Importantly, neither theory has been accepted (or rejected) by the 
Supreme Court. Instead, First Amendment Equal Protection represents a 
typology of the Court‘s analyses in a distinct body of cases.147  
The heart of First Amendment Equal Protection executes the value 
that every citizen should have an equal chance to participate in public 
dialogue.
148 
In doing so, ―[i]t takes up Kenneth Karst‘s insight that ‗the 
principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment‘s 
protections against government regulation of the content of speech.‘‖149 
It also furthers Dean Robert Post‘s instruction that ―[e]quality of speech 
derives from an equality of speakers.‖150 As a substantive matter, the 
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection derives from civil rights 
era cases where the Equal Protection Clause was used to protect and 
secure First Amendment rights to unpopular expression.
151
 It also 
derives from certain First Amendment cases in which vague and 
incoherent standards permitted officials to deny access to public fora 
―based on [officials‘] hostility [toward] particular viewpoints.‖152 Like 
the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment is foremost 
                                                                                                                     
 146. See Monaghan, supra note 145, at 524 (―[W]hen the subject matter of speech is 
political in character . . . , the need for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater.‖). 
 147. See infra Section I.B. 
 148. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12. 
 149. Id. at 2410 n.7 (citing Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 140, at 21). 
This is consistent with Professor Karst‘s definition of equal citizenship, whereby the Fourteenth 
Amendment confers a right to every citizen ―to be treated as a respected and responsible 
participant in community public life.‖ Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: 
Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007).  
 150. Post, supra note 36, at 484–85 (―The equality of status of ideas within public 
discourse follows directly from the equality of political status of citizens who attempt to make 
government responsive to their views.‖). 
 151. See, e.g., Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (―The Equal 
Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored 
to their legitimate objectives.‖ (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342–43 (1972))). 
 152. See Foley, supra note 144, at 960–61. The abuse of discretion is often aided by vague 
legal standards that camouflage discriminatory intentions. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal 
Protection, supra note 12, at 2441. As a result, ―[a]bsent clearly defined rules that limit official 
decisionmakers‘ discretion, discrimination against unpopular speech may escape detection.‖ Id. 
at 2430. 
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concerned with improper government motive.
153 
The synthesis of these 
interests, along with both clauses‘ pursuit of equality, gives rise to the 
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection.
154 
 
Because discretion can conceal intentional discrimination, under the 
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection, courts must be as wary of 
discretion in the sphere of political participation as they are in the 
sphere of freedom of expression. Importantly, First Amendment Equal 
Protection does not rely exclusively on discretion as a trigger for the 
conjoined application of First Amendment and equal protection 
principles; rather, it is the core nature of expressive activity itself that 
commands the dual protection of these muscular constitutional 
provisions.  
Thus, First Amendment Equal Protection leads to a more robust 
undertaking of equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment that is 
informed by the First Amendment to determine whether discriminatory 
motives are at play. To that end, First Amendment Equal Protection 
embodies four ideals: (1) the requirement of clear standards, (2) 
broadened justiciability, (3) leniency toward facial challenges, and (4) 
increased judicial fact-finding.
155
 These ideals comprise both procedural 
and substantive variations from conventional equal protection. Clear 
standards limit the exercise of discretion that can mask 
discrimination.
156
 Broad justiciability allows courts to entertain cases by 
relaxing standing requirements in order to increase enforcement against 
rights violations.
157
 Leniency toward facial challenges permits litigants 
to challenge suspect laws directly before harm or injury occurs.
158
 
Finally, increased judicial fact-finding enables courts to consider 
context in investigating specific constitutional violations and their 
underlying motivations.
159
  
Without identifying it as such, the Court has employed First 
Amendment Equal Protection in certain categories of cases involving 
freedom of expression. For example, the Court‘s inherent distrust of 
official discretion in the speech context ―animates [many] public fora, 
censorship, and civil rights era cases.‖160 In these cases, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Kagan, supra note 6, at 414 (―[T]he application of First Amendment law is best 
understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting.‖). 
 154. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2441. 
 155. Id. at 2430. 
 156. Id. at 2442.  
 157. Id. at 2447.  
 158. Id. at 2446–47. 
 159. Id. at 2447. 
 160. The Court was animated in these cases by a suspicion of racial bias or viewpoint 
discrimination. See id. at 2441 (―For the most part, these cases arise in contexts where the Court 
smelled a rat—that is, where circumstances suggested that discrimination against disfavored 
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employs an especially searching mode of analysis that involves relaxed 
standards of justiciability, facial challenges, and increased judicial fact-
finding when faced with official discretion that potentially masks 
discrimination in the realm of expression.
161
 
B.  First Amendment Equal Protection at Work 
First Amendment Equal Protection reveals itself in particular 
categories of equal protection cases whose outcomes cannot be 
explained by traditional equal protection analysis. These are cases in 
which the Court departed from the norm of requiring evidence of facial 
or intentional discrimination to substantiate an equal protection 
violation.
162 
Importantly, many of these cases involve rights of political 
participation. The cases are grouped into the following categories: jury 
selection; political restructuring; and one person, one vote.
163
 Despite 
the Court‘s silence regarding its rationale, however, the collective 
narrative of the cases situates them comfortably within First 
Amendment Equal Protection theory and provides a guidepost for other 
challenges in the realm of political participation, especially where racial 
disparities loom.
164
 Moreover, while each grouping of cases is 
instructive concerning the potential application of First Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
viewpoints or certain speakers was at play, but where that discrimination was difficult to 
substantiate.‖). 
 161. First Amendment Equal Protection may also be characterized as a version of what 
Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes termed ―electoral exceptionalism.‖ Schauer & Pildes, 
supra note 18, at 1805. Electoral exceptionalism defines elections as bounded domains for 
purposes of constitutional scrutiny. This theoretical circumscription of elections for regulation 
purposes enables a distinct application of First Amendment principles that is particular to the 
electoral context and the highly protected speech within that domain, whether or not that 
application falls squarely within the First Amendment‘s scope. See id. (―According to electoral 
exceptionalism, elections should be constitutionally understood as (relatively) bounded domains 
of communicative activity. Because of the defined scope of this activity, it would be possible to 
prescribe or apply First Amendment principles to electoral processes that do not necessarily 
apply through the full reach of the First Amendment.‖). 
 162. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1105, 1127 (1989) (―[T]he voting cases appear to require only a showing of disparate impact 
plus a showing that the jurisdiction has engaged in other types of discrimination in the past.‖); 
see also Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2467–86 (categorizing 
this grouping of cases under the heading ―Unconventional Equal Protection‖ and suggesting that 
these decisions ―share a willingness to find an equal protection violation on something less than 
the ordinary showing of discriminatory intent‖).  
 163. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2412 (categorizing three 
areas of equal protection jurisprudence in which the Court has been willing to find an equal 
protection violation based on unequality of democratic participation).  
 164. Id. at 2467 (―[T]he approach that the Court has taken in each of these areas can be 
understood as motivated by concerns similar to those which underlie the First Amendment 
Equal Protection cases.‖).  
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Equal Protection to future vote denial challenges such as felon 
disenfranchisement, the one person, one vote and political restructuring 
cases are most pertinent.  
1.  One Person, One Vote Cases 
One person, one vote cases are premised on a principle of equality. 
In short, they hold that the value of each citizen‘s vote should be equal 
to that of any other citizen‘s. While one person, one vote cases were not 
race-based challenges per se, they arose out of a context of wholesale 
discrimination against African-Americans in which states refused to 
participate in congressional reapportionment because it would 
potentially strengthen African-American political power in light of 
substantial population changes.
165
 Although the Court was at first loath 
to ―enter this political thicket,‖166 over time it pruned from the American 
electoral system a host of practices designed to discriminate against 
African-Americans in the electoral arena, including vintage vote-denial 
practices such as grandfather clauses,
167
 literacy and character tests,
168
 
the poll tax,
169
 the all-white primary,
170
 and discriminatory failure to 
reapportion.
171
 These practices were struck down largely because the 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (affirming the denial of equitable 
relief to black citizens who were unlawfully denied the right to vote). 
 166. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that courts should not ―enter 
this political thicket‖ of malapportionment under the ―political question‖ doctrine); see also 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963) (holding that a ―county unit‖ vote count system 
that weighted votes cast in rural counties more heavily than those cast in urban counties was 
unconstitutional).  
 167. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915) (holding that the grandfather clause 
in question ―unlawfully, willfully and fraudulently [deprived] certain negro citizens, on account 
of their race and color, of a right to vote at a general election‖). 
 168. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1965) (describing how Louisiana‘s 
―interpretation test‖ required voters to interpret a section of the state or federal Constitution to 
the satisfaction of the registrar prior to voting). Literacy tests were not banned by the Court, but 
are prohibited statutorily under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 if applied ―to deny or abridge the 
right . . . to vote on account of race or color.‖ See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (1965). 
 169. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (―We conclude that a State 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the 
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.‖). 
 170. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (plurality opinion) (holding that the white-
only primary restricted the right to vote on the basis of race and color); id. at 484 (Clark, J., 
concurring) (―[B]ecause the [white]-indorsed nominee meets no opposition in the Democratic 
primary, the Negro minority‘s vote is nullified at the sole stage of the local political process 
where the bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make it count.‖); Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (overturning a Texas statute that discriminated ―by the 
distinction of color alone‖).  
 171. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative seats ―must 
be apportioned on a population basis‖). 
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vast discretion that officials possessed in administering elections served 
to hide racial discrimination and bias. In this way, the one person, one 
vote cases ―serve as a prophylactic against decisionmakers acting based 
on venal motives,‖172 and they share concerns of excessive discretion 
and unclear standards with First Amendment Equal Protection theory.
173
 
2.  Political Restructuring Cases 
Another body of cases that illustrates First Amendment Equal 
Protection and its application in the electoral arena involves political- 
structural issues such as at-large voting systems and racial 
gerrymandering, the latter of which submerges minority interests. 
Political-restructuring cases concern political systems that burden the 
ability of certain groups to achieve greater political equality through 
participating in the political process. Like one person, one vote cases, in 
political-restructuring cases the Court does not require the traditional or 
conventional showing of intentional or facial discrimination to find an 
equal protection violation. Instead, in cases such as Hunter v. 
Erickson,
174
 Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
175
 and Romer 
v. Evans, 
176 
the Court held that laws imposing unequal burdens on 
certain groups to participate in the political process are unconstitutional.  
3.  Vote-Denial Cases 
First Amendment Equal Protection can also be traced to vote-denial 
contexts. In Hunter v. Underwood,
177
 the Court rejected the argument 
that a nondiscriminatory justification for felon disenfranchisement laws 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2483–84. 
 173. Id. at 2483 (―[One person, one vote cases] arise from a concern that without clear 
rules by which to cabin official discretion over the electoral process, discrimination against 
politically disfavored groups might otherwise escape detection.‖). The abuse of discretion 
surrounding these practices is well-known and does not bear repeating here. It is sufficient to 
state that officials vested with the discretion to determine whether prospective voters have 
adequately interpreted a provision of the Constitution, are sufficiently literate, or should pay a 
poll tax in order to vote have virtually unchecked authority to exercise that discretion 
discriminatorily. See id., at 2483–87, for an analysis of one person, one vote cases. The Court‘s 
imposition of the one person, one vote standard, as well as its ban of specific vote-denial 
practices, eliminated the vast majority of this sort of discretion in the electoral arena. See, e.g., 
id. at 2485 (―The one-person, one-vote rule promotes uniformity, consistency, fairness, and 
neutrality in decisions about apportionment by limiting judicial discretion to one simple 
question: Do all districts have the same number of residents?‖ (quoting Spencer Overton, Rules, 
Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 
79 (2002))). 
 174. 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969). 
 175. 458 U.S. 457, 486–87 (1982). 
 176. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 177. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
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could outweigh evidence of discriminatory intent.
178 
Most important, 
however, is Hunter‘s reliance on the seminal First Amendment case 
United States v. O’Brien to underscore the difficulty in determining 
legislative motive.
179
 The Court ultimately determined that the 
difficulties in O’Brien did not matter in Hunter because of the strong 
evidence of discriminatory intent. 
In addition, some scholars have argued different variations of the 
theory that Bush v. Gore extended the First Amendment Equal 
Protection precedent to the voting process.
180
 They suggest that the 
Court surreptitiously and, perhaps, unintentionally relied on First 
Amendment doctrine in holding that, for want of clear standards, the 
Florida ballot recount during the 2000 presidential election violated 
equal protection.
181
 Bush v. Gore does indeed appear to incorporate the 
four constituent principles of First Amendment Equal Protection: (1) the 
precision requirement, (2) liberal rules of justiciability, (3) receptivity to 
facial challenges, and (4) independent examination of the evidence.  
However, in the aforementioned cases, the Court did not expressly 
rely on First Amendment principles as a legal rationale for the remedies 
it imposed, but instead, the Court‘s ―recognition of the dangers to 
expressive equality posed by official and quasi-official racial bias is 
implicit in these decisions.‖182 The cases are unconventional within 
equal protection jurisprudence because they join seemingly divergent 
doctrines of discretion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
respectively. Indeed, First Amendment Equal Protection resolves ―the 
discordant doctrines of discretion that predominate under the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause,‖183 whereby official 
discretion in the realm of speech is suspect and official discretion in the 
realm of equal protection is presumptively benign. 
C.  First Amendment Equal Protection and Viewpoint Discrimination 
The synergy between the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause is firmly rooted in the early development of viewpoint 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 232–33 (―[A]n additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not 
render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks . . . .‖).  
 179. Id. at 228 (―‗Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous 
matter.‘‖ (quoting United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968))). 
 180. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, 
Disenfranchisement, and the Help American Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1249 
(2005) [hereinafter Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform]; Tokaji, First Amendment Equal 
Protection, supra note 9, at 2487. 
 181. See Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform, supra note 180. 
 182. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2441. 
 183. See id. at 2496.  
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discrimination jurisprudence.
184
 Beginning with its decision in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court treated content-based 
restrictions as discrimination in the mode of equal protection 
analyses.
185
 In Mosley, the Court considered Chicago‘s restriction on 
picketing near a school during school hours under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and held that the statute‘s exemption of labor 
picketing was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
186
 For seven 
months prior to the enactment of the statute, the plaintiff in Mosley 
peacefully occupied a public sidewalk adjoining the school, carrying a 
sign that read: ―Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones 
High School has a black quota.‖187  
In invalidating the statute, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for a 
unanimous Court and acknowledged that the equal protection and First 
Amendment claims in the case were ―closely intertwined‖ because the 
regulation involved expressive conduct and classifications based on 
subject matter.
188
 Drawing upon the equal protection doctrine, he 
reasoned that ―[a]s in all equal protection cases . . . the crucial question 
is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably 
furthered by the differential treatment.‖189 Further, the Court expressly 
referenced the intersectionality of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
and acknowledged the relevance of both constitutional provisions to a 
healthy democratic sphere and individual liberty:  
To permit the continued building of our politics and 
culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, 
our people are guaranteed the right to express any 
thought, free from government censorship. The essence 
of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any 
restriction on expressive activity because of its content 
would completely undercut the ―profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.‖190  
                                                                                                                     
 184. See John A. Humbach, Teens, Porn, and Video Games: Is It Time to Rethink 
Ginsberg?, AMICUS–ONLINE COMPANION TO HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 n.48 (2010) (citing 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1980) and Sable Commc‘ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
119, 126 (1989)), http://harvardcrcl.org/2010/10/30/teens-porn-and-video-games-is-it-time-to-
rethink-ginsberg/. 
 185. See id.  
 186. See Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 187. Id. at 93. 
 188. Id. at 95. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 95–96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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Post-Mosley, the Court adopted a heightened scrutiny approach to 
content-based restrictions on expressive activity, requiring that ―the 
legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests,‖ and 
stating that ―the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must 
be carefully scrutinized.‖191 Mosley demonstrates that the Court has 
already recognized the intersectionality of equal protection doctrine and 
First Amendment protections.
192
 Vote-denial claims simply require that 
the heightened scrutiny and judicial vigilance achieved in viewpoint 
discrimination be applied as forcefully as when they concern 
infringements on expression in the political arena.  
The question then becomes why conventional equal protection 
doctrine is not enough. The answer is not that First Amendment Equal 
Protection will always yield a different result. Rather, ―[t]he critical 
distinction between First Amendment Equal Protection and 
Conventional Equal Protection lies not so much in how they answer the 
theoretical question of what constitutes a violation. The difference lies 
instead in their answer to the question of how to prevent and remedy 
such violations.‖193 Setting aside the propriety of the Court‘s decision 
that the Equal Protection Clause applies only to intentional racial 
discrimination and such discrimination cannot be proved solely by 
evidence of disparate impact,
194
 a question remains as to how 
intentional discrimination can be proved when there is no proverbial 
smoking gun but the disparate results are palpable.
195
  
On the equal protection side, the Court has not taken up a rigorous 
qualitative assessment of official conduct in the area of political 
expression to identify intentional discrimination that may occur below 
the radar.
196 
Although Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp.
197
 articulated certain factors that can give rise to a 
finding of intentional racial discrimination, it provided little guidance 
on the qualitative assessment courts should perform when both First 
Amendment and equal protection interests are at stake or when the 
                                                                                                                     
 191. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1980).  
 192. See also infra Section II.B. 
 193. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2412.  
 194. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 195. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2455 (―Stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause‘s prohibition extends only to intentional discrimination . . . raises as 
many questions as it answers.‖). 
 196. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); see also 
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Proof of Discriminatory Intent, 91 HARV. L. REV. 163, 168 
(1977) (suggesting the limited applicability of Arlington Heights beyond limited, routine 
contexts). 
 197. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267–68. 
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allegation of discrimination is not primarily racial in nature.
198
 First 
Amendment Equal Protection, however, calls into doubt discretion 
applied to expressive conduct, particularly where there are racially 
disparate results. The constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement laws 
is more appropriately evaluated through First Amendment Equal 
Protection than through traditional Equal Protection analysis because of 
the expressive conduct involved.
199
  
D.  The First Amendment Equal Protection Claim for Felon 
Disenfranchisement 
Historically, states often crafted felon disenfranchisement laws with 
a racially discriminatory motive.
200
 Today, on the other hand, most 
felon disenfranchisement statutes have no evidence of racial animus in 
their enactment. However, by foregrounding First Amendment equality 
concerns about viewpoint neutrality and Equal Protection Clause 
concerns about fundamental rights, First Amendment Equal Protection 
introduces an alternative theory for challenging these race-neutral laws.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 198. See id.; see also Julia Kobick, Note, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk 
Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
517, 561 (2010) (discussing the stagnant nature of equal protection jurisprudence). Arlington 
Heights established a burden-shifting scheme in cases where a state action or policy is 
challenged as racially discriminatory. 429 U.S. at 266. It held that a plaintiff seeking to establish 
a prima facie case of an equal protection violation must first show—through use of 
disproportionate impact, legislative history, a pattern of events, or departures from usual 
procedures—that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision. Id. The burden then 
shifts to the government to show that the same decision would have resulted even if the 
discriminatory motive did not exist. Id. at 268. This standard requires a palpable showing of 
discriminatory intent or motive that will not be intuited from statistical evidence alone, no 
matter how compelling. Id. at 269–70. 
 199. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2411 (comparing 
Washington v. Davis and McCleskey v. Kemp with viewpoint discrimination cases such as 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham for the proposition that the Court presumes decision makers will 
generally exercise discretion in a non-racially discriminatory manner despite evidence of a 
statistically significant disparate impact on particular racial or ethnic groups but does not 
presume non-discrimination in the context of viewpoint restrictions). The apparent difference 
between the cases involving political expression and ones such as Washington and McCleskey is 
that ―the Court exhibits a much greater willingness to trust government decisionmakers—to 
assume that they will exercise their discretion in a fair and unbiased manner—where race is 
concerned, than where speech is concerned.‖ Id. 
 200. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62–63, 162 (2000).  
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1.  Felon Disenfranchisement as Viewpoint Discrimination: The General 
Claim 
In lieu of taking up the felon disenfranchisement laws of a specific 
state, this Section sets forth a generalized First Amendment Equal 
Protection claim for viewpoint discrimination. First Amendment Equal 
Protection theory requires the Court to approach states‘ discretion in 
enacting felon disenfranchisement laws with suspicion in light of the 
dual nature of the rights implicated—the fundamental right to vote and 
the right to freedom of expression absent viewpoint discrimination. To 
trigger First Amendment Equal Protection, the regulation at issue must 
affect a speech interest and yield a disparate impact. In the case of felon 
disenfranchisement, the speech is political expression in the form of 
voting and the disparate impact is based on the suspect classification of 
race. Once this threshold is met, First Amendment Equal Protection 
imposes a burden-shifting scheme and heightened scrutiny. The 
suspicion of state action inherent in First Amendment Equal Protection 
requires that the burden shift to the state to defend the constitutionality 
of the regulation under strict scrutiny. That is, the state must show that 
the voting regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest. Unlike conventional equal protection 
jurisprudence, where the plaintiff must show that discrimination was a 
motivating factor in the government‘s decision to enact, enforce, or 
maintain the laws, First Amendment Equal Protection asks the state to 
defend those laws that facially infringe on equality principles.  
First Amendment Equal Protection would prohibit a government 
interest rooted in viewpoint discrimination because it contravenes the 
equality principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
201
 States 
would have to identify, on viewpoint neutral grounds, a constitutional 
basis for denying the franchise to citizens with felony convictions. 
Although the hallmarks of First Amendment Equal Protection are 
(1) clear standards, (2) broadened justiciability, (3) leniency toward 
facial challenges, and (4) increased judicial fact-finding, felon 
disenfranchisement laws are generally characterized by clear standards 
and do not involve discretion in enforcement by election officials and 
administrators. Judicial suspicion of these laws must, therefore, derive 
from other indicia of improper motive such as disproportionate impact. 
Further, First Amendment Equal Protection does not question whether 
the authority to exercise discretion exists. Instead, it accepts for 
purposes of argument that states‘ authority to disenfranchise citizens 
                                                                                                                     
 201. A determination of motive in this context recognizes that ―[t]he key principle with 
respect to motive is that the government may not limit speech on grounds of mere disapproval, 
no matter whose or how widely shared.‖ Kagan, supra note 6, at 430. 
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with felony convictions is constitutionally sanctioned. However, the 
broad justiciability afforded such claims under First Amendment Equal 
Protection allows courts to adjudicate these claims because of the 
exigency of the speech interests at stake.  
2.  Meeting the Threshold: Speech Interests and Disparate Impact  
As noted above, the threshold showing to trigger First Amendment 
Equal Protection in the vote denial context is a speech interest and 
disparate impact. The speech interest in voting is set forth in Section 
III.A of this Article. The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement, 
by definition, falls upon citizens with felony convictions as a class that 
does not have constitutionally protected status. However, there are other 
aspects of the disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement that 
underscore the equality rights at stake. The racially disparate impact of 
felon disenfranchisement is well-documented; certain data, however, 
bear repeating here to illustrate its multidimensional impact not only in 
terms of race, but also in terms of class and partisanship.  
Lying at the intersection of two historically discriminatory 
systems—penal and electoral—felon disenfranchisement excludes 
approximately 5.85 million citizens from the electorate. United States 
prisons and jails currently hold 2.4 million inmates, or one in every 100 
adults.
202
 As a result of these combined factors, the United States boasts 
the highest incarceration rate of any modern democratic nation.
203
 The 
                                                                                                                     
202. The criminal profile of the prison population reveals that 20% of all state inmates are 
incarcerated for drug offenses. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fd 
lawsinus_Aug2012.pdf ) [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT]; see Ilyana Kuziemko & 
Steven D. Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2043, 
2051 (2004). Moreover, nearly half of all convictions (federal and state) are for nonviolent 
offenses. THE SENTENCING PROJECT; see THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES 
AT THE MILLENNIUM 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-
05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf (indicating that 1,169,118 of the 2,042,479 Americans 
incarcerated in 2001 were convicted of non-violent offenses). 
 203. KING‘S COLLEGE, LONDON, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD 
PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). The 
United States leads the world in the gross number of people incarcerated and the number of 
inmates per capita. The United States is the only country that imprisons more than one percent 
of its adult population. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 
2008 5 (2008). Indeed, overcrowding is a chronic issue in U.S. prisons, with certain cases 
warranting court intervention. Recently, pursuant to the Prison Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, a 
three-judge panel ordered the release of thousands of prisoners from California‘s overcrowded 
prison system. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, United States District Court Composed Of 
Three Judges Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 2284, No. C01-1351 TEH (Aug. 4, 2009). The Supreme 
Court affirmed the three-judge district court‘s decision. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) 
(5-4 decision). 
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racial disparities in the penal system are just as stark. Of the 7.3 million 
persons in correctional facilities,
204
 or one in thirty-two adults, a 
staggering 46% are African-American males, who make up only 7% 
percent of the general population. Twenty percent are Latinos (male and 
female combined) who comprise 16% of the general population.
205
 Of 
the prison population itself, blacks total approximately 38%, while 
making up only 13% of the general population.
206
 Latinos are now the 
majority of all sentenced federal felony offenders, comprising 50.4% of 
this population, while blacks comprise 19.8% and whites 26.3%.
207 
 
Disproportionate disenfranchisement occurs when these skewed 
prison statistics confront race- and class-neutral felon 
disenfranchisement laws. The general impact of these laws 
disenfranchises one in forty Americans.
208
 Most of the 5.85 million 
disenfranchised are not in prison and are either on parole, on probation, 
or permanently banned from voting because of a felony conviction. Like 
the racially skewed imprisonment numbers, felon disenfranchisement 
also has a disparate impact in terms of race, class, and partisanship, 
creating a disenfranchised population that is overwhelmingly minority, 
poor, and Democrat.
209 
Although state justifications may be based on a 
suspicion of an immoral, criminal viewpoint, First Amendment Equal 
Protection instructs that courts should be suspicious of such rationales if 
they potentially mask motivations such as racial discrimination. 
Motivations of class or partisanship may not compel the same scrutiny 
but help to further contextualize felon disenfranchisement‘s impact. 
a.  Race 
In addition to the disparate racial impact set forth above, ―in 14 
states, more than 1 in 10 African Americans have lost the right to vote 
by virtue of a felony conviction, and 5 of these states disqualify over 20 
                                                                                                                     
 204. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE: CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm.   
 205. Id.  
 206. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 202.  
 207. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 44 (2011) (reflecting 
statistics for the first nine fiscal years. Increased immigration prosecutions explain most of the 
increase in the number of Latinos sent to prison over the last decade).   
 208. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 202. 
 209. Of that 5.85 million, almost 1.5 million are African-American men, while African-
American men comprise only 13% of the overall population. Over 2 million white Americans 
are disenfranchised. Over 560,000 of the disenfranchised are veterans. One million are persons 
who have completed their sentences and are living largely in poor, densely populated, urban 
communities in various pockets of the country. See The Voting Rights, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited March 9, 
2012).  
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/3
2013] FIRST AMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 155 
 
percent of the African American voting age population.‖210 The impact 
in local communities is even more acute. For example, one in eight 
males in Georgia (one in seven in Atlanta) are disenfranchised because 
of a felony conviction.
211 
Not readily quantifiable is the effect of 
disenfranchisement as a community contagion—that is, the culture of 
political disenfranchisement and exclusion that occurs by virtue of 
living in households or communities with a large, concentrated 
population of disenfranchised persons.
212
 Like the one person, one vote 
cases, felon disenfranchisement is compelling as a First Amendment 
Equal Protection issue because it also functions as a group-based 
harm.
213
 By internalizing and importing societal divisions into the 
democratic process of voting, felon disenfranchisement laws exacerbate 
and perpetuate these divisions and contribute to a cycle of community 
or group disenfranchisement.
214 
 
As a result, individuals who have no affiliation with the penal system 
pay the costs of felon disenfranchisement in the currency of political 
power. In short, Jim Crow laws and overt, racially discriminatory vote-
denial practices have been replaced with mass incarceration; deepening 
class divisions; and race neutral felon disenfranchisement and other 
voting qualification laws. In the end, the complexion of the 
disenfranchised has changed little since the era of Jim Crow. 
                                                                                                                     
 210. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 2, at 79. 
 211. Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The Vanishing Black Electorate: Felony 
Disenfranchisement in Atlanta, Georgia, The Sentencing Project 3 (2004) 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_vanishingblackelectorate.pdf. 
 212. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 5–6, 113–14 (2007); see also Daniel Horn, Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Economic Threat: Class Warfare Revisited, 49–50 (on file with 
author).  
 213. As Professor Owen Fiss has long espoused, the central concern of the Equal 
Protection Clause is group subordination. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 123–24 (1976); see also Symposium, The Origins and Fate of 
Antisubordination Theory: A Symposium on Owen Fiss’s Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002) (symposia of articles analyzing Professor Fiss‘s 
article). 
 214. See, e.g., Dugree-Pearson, supra note 113, at 371–77. Professor Michelle Alexander‘s 
twenty first century descriptive account of the intergenerational effects of both race based and 
race neutral disfranchisement illuminates this point: ―Jarvious Cotton cannot vote. Like his 
father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather, he has been denied the right 
to participate in our electoral democracy. Cotton‘s family tree tells the story of several 
generations of black men who were born in the United States but who were denied the most 
basic freedom that democracy promises—the freedom to vote for those who will make the rules 
and laws that govern one‘s life.‖ MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1 (2010). 
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b.  Class 
The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement is not just based on 
race; there are palpable class dimensions to the American carceral state. 
The prison population does not represent a socioeconomic cross section 
of the general population. Studies conducted in the 1990s at the 
University of Georgia showed that the majority of Georgia‘s state 
prisoners had incomes under the poverty level at the time of 
incarceration.
215 
Moreover, the data showed that income had a 
significant correlation with sentence length.
216 
Offenders with incomes 
of less than $5,000 were sentenced most harshly.
217
 That group received 
sentences 6.2 months longer than people who had incomes between 
$25,000 and $35,000.
218
 More recent data show that, in terms of 
educational attainment, roughly two-thirds of all inmates do not have a 
high school diploma or have only a GED.
219 
Having no high school 
diploma correlated with an additional sentence of 1.2 months.
220
  
The intersection of race and class makes the class implications of 
felon disenfranchisement increasingly relevant. There is high 
correlation between being black and being poorly educated and in 
prison. In 2008, 37% of black males aged twenty to thirty-four with no 
high school diploma or GED
 
were incarcerated, compared to 12% of 
whites and 7% of Hispanics of the same age and educational status.
221 
 
To the extent that society relies on the political process and not the 
judiciary to regulate economic inequality, it is imperative that all 
stakeholders be permitted to participate in the political process.
222
 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See generally David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001). 
 216. Id. at 301. 
 217. Id.   
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at 295. GED stands for General Education Development. One can obtain a GED 
after passing a qualifying examination and without completing the high school curriculum. 
http://cms.oregon.gov/ccwd/GED/PDF/GEDFAQ.pdf. GED can also stand for ―general 
equivalency diploma.‖ THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 301 (11th ed. 2004). 
 220. Id. at 301.  
 221. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION‘S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 8 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996pro 
d/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf. In addition, black male unemployment rates are twice that of white 
males‘. CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & JARYN FIELDS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE BLACK AND 
WHITE LABOR GAP IN AMERICA: WHY AFRICAN AMERICANS STRUGGLE TO FIND JOBS AND 
REMAIN EMPLOYED COMPARED TO WHITES AM. 3 (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2011/07/pdf/black_unemployment.pdf. 
 222. Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State 
Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2008) (―In the standard theory, the quintessential 
function of the political process is to balance or reconcile competing economic interests.‖).  
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Indeed, ―[t]he prevailing assumption is that economic interests are 
highly amenable to pluralistic bargaining and majority rule, since 
economic losers in one deal can readily regroup and re-negotiate to 
defend their interests another day or in another deal.‖223 However, when 
―economic losers‖ are denied the right to vote, this theory is troubled 
and the political process cannot be relied upon to address economic 
inequalities. 
c.  Partisanship 
Finally, in examining the impact of felon disenfranchisement, the 
interconnection of race, poverty, and partisanship must also be taken 
into account. The demographics of the disenfranchised population 
correlate highly with Democratic Party affiliation. Studies of the impact 
of re-enfranchisement on electoral outcomes demonstrate that the 
Democratic Party‘s successes (and failures) can hinge on the degree of 
felon disenfranchisement in a given election. For example, Professors 
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza predicted that the Democrats would 
have gained parity in the U.S. Senate in 1984 and would have 
maintained control of the Senate from 1986 to 2002, when their study 
concluded.
224 
In addition, they predicted that current felon 
disenfranchisement rates would have jeopardized John F. Kennedy‘s 
election in 1960.
225 
Moreover, in the 2000 presidential election, 
President George W. Bush won by 536 Floridian votes. Absent 
Florida‘s strict felon disenfranchisement laws, Vice President Al Gore 
would have won the presidency with roughly 60,000 additional votes in 
Florida.  Although a majority of the Court has maintained that excessive 
partisanship in gerrymandering is justiciable,
226
 it has yet to adjudicate a 
case where partisan influence rose to the level of unconstitutionality. 
Nonetheless, here—where the law at issue is a voting qualification—the 
disparate partisan impact should also be justiciable.  
3.  Compelling Government Interest 
Once a plaintiff asserts a speech interest and demonstrates disparate 
impact with respect to the voting qualification, First Amendment Equal 
Protection requires the court to apply strict scrutiny to determine the 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Id. 
 224. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences 
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 792, 794 (2002) 
(―[W]e estimate that the Democratic Party would have gained parity in 1984 and held majority 
control of the U.S. Senate from 1986 to the present.‖). 
225. Id. at 792; see also Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward 
the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003). 
 226. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281, 305 (2004). 
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law‘s constitutionality. Accordingly, the state must provide a 
compelling government interest in the law that is viewpoint neutral and 
it must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored. As set forth in 
Section I.C, the common justifications are insufficient, as they 
constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination. However, this 
Article does not purport to exhaust all justifications for felon 
disenfranchisement or deal with the issue of narrow tailoring. Nor does 
it need to.
227 
To the extent that a felon disenfranchisement statute is 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Although rationales for felon disenfranchisement that are unrelated to how citizens 
with criminal convictions will exercise the right to vote are beyond the general scope of this 
Article, three prevailing alternative rationales merit brief discussion: (1) punishment and 
retribution, (2) deterrence, and (3) the regulation of prisons. As noted earlier, theories of 
punishment and retributive justice as rationales for vote denial may be challengeable on 
independent constitutional grounds. For example, a punitive rationale for felon 
disenfranchisement laws may also be constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 50, 
at 1150; Thompson, supra note 112, at 171, 173. Moreover, these goals are inconsistent with 
broader democratic interests of inclusion and participation, especially in light of felon 
disenfranchisement‘s impact on both individuals and communities.  
The rationale of deterrence is easily dismissed for its fecklessness. There is no empirical 
support for the notion that prospective criminals are deterred by the potential of vote denial. 
Indeed, the consequence of vote denial is rarely disclosed at sentencing or in negotiating plea 
bargains. As for the regulation of prisons, it is true that prisons are restrictive environments. As 
such, prisons have been exempted from the full force of the First Amendment in instances where 
penological interests supersede freedom of expression (or association). See, e.g., Shaw v. 
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment does provide inmates a 
right to provide legal advice to other inmates so long as restrictions on such communications are 
―reasonably related to legitimate penological interests‖ (quoting  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
89 (1987))); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989) (upholding restrictions on 
publications in prisons if the restrictions are ―reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests‖); Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (upholding general prohibition on inmate correspondence 
between institutions); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners‘ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127 (1977) (upholding 
under the First Amendment restrictions on union organizing by inmates on the grounds that 
―[t]he creation of an inmate union will naturally result in increasing the existing friction between 
inmates and prison personnel. It can also create friction between union inmates and non-union 
inmates‖). But see Jones, 433 U.S. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority‘s 
deference to the ―rational‖ exercise of discretion by prison officials in prohibiting union 
organizing by inmates).  
However, this rationale fails on at least two accounts. Exercising the right to vote does not 
threaten a penological interest in the safety, order, or administration of prisons. In fact, two 
states, Maine and Vermont, have successfully permitted inmate voting for 180 years without 
incident. Vermont, Maine Allow Felon Votes, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 28, 2006) 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/jan/28/20060128-104343-6528r/ (stating that 
Vermont and Maine have allowed felons to vote since their founding 180 years ago) Moreover, 
this rationale provides little to no justification for the continued disenfranchisement of citizens 
with criminal convictions who are either on parole or have completed their sentences. Second, 
and more importantly, if a state‘s felon disfranchisement laws were motivated by multiple 
factors, the ―but-for‖ predominance of impermissible viewpoint discrimination is sufficient to 
render the regulation unconstitutional. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 228, 232 
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based on viewpoint content, it is unconstitutional despite the existence 
of other constitutional justifications. Moreover, if there is no legitimate, 
compelling government interest, narrow tailoring is moot.  
Accordingly, absent a finding that a state‘s felon disenfranchisement 
scheme is motivated solely by viewpoint-neutral interests, the laws 
cannot survive strict scrutiny. Even with this heightened scrutiny, 
however, First Amendment Equal Protection analysis would not likely 
eradicate all felon disenfranchisement schemes. It would, though, lead 
to courts taking a more careful look at their justifications, impact, and 
constitutionality. 
III.  LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL BARRIERS TO APPLYING FIRST 
AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION TO THE VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIM AGAINST FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Linking felon disenfranchisement to the concept of viewpoint 
discrimination may not be enough to convince courts to apply the 
nuanced equal protection treatment to these laws that First Amendment 
Equal Protection envisions. There are a number of legal and conceptual 
barriers that must be addressed, namely whether (1) voting can be 
considered speech or expression to trigger First Amendment principles 
in the equal protection context; (2) Ramirez is a legal bar to equal 
protection claims against felon disenfranchisement; and (3) there are 
any further indicia of the Court‘s view toward First Amendment 
application in contexts other than campaign finance and ballot access. 
While the judicial theory of viewpoint discrimination set forth in 
Section I.B of this Article provides important insight into this last issue, 
the Court‘s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence illuminates, perhaps 
even more explicitly, how the Court conceives of the role of the First 
Amendment in voting rights cases. In addition, Ramirez has proved a 
formidable barrier to both statutory and constitutional claims against 
felon disenfranchisement claims. Accordingly, this Part analyzes 
Ramirez and the Court‘s last pronouncement on felon 
disenfranchisement, Hunter v. Underwood, to determine whether an 
equal protection claim is legally viable. It starts, however, with a brief 
exploration of the linkages between voting and speech or expressive 
conduct. This Part ultimately concludes that the potential legal and 
conceptual obstacles to First Amendment Equal Protection‘s application 
                                                                                                                     
(1985). As part of the judicial fact-finding consistent with First Amendment Equal Protection, 
the Court would have to determine whether a state‘s viewpoint rationale predominates its 
reasons for enacting or maintaining a felon disenfranchisement scheme. To the extent that any 
regulation is motivated by impermissible viewpoint discrimination, however, it is subject to 
constitutional challenge. See also Figler, supra note 84, at 733–35 (―[D]isenfranchisement 
excluded offenders from society and thus increased the likelihood of recidivism.‖). 
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in this context are surmountable.  
A.  Is Voting Speech? 
Historically, the Court has found speech interests in the electoral 
arena, specifically in the domains of campaign finance and ballot 
access.
228
 Although rooted in the doctrinal framework of the First 
Amendment, both ballot access and campaign finance cases provide the 
doctrinal and ideological moorings in which the Court can anchor a 
First Amendment Equal Protection approach to voting rights cases. 
Inasmuch as expenditures are a form of expression under the First 
Amendment, so is the act of voting.
229 Moreover, ―‗[j]ust as excluding 
candidates from the ballot ‗burdens voters‘ freedom of association,‘ so 
too does the exclusion of actual voters for a candidate.‖230 Coupled with 
the powerful concerns of viewpoint discrimination that have animated 
First Amendment jurisprudence for two centuries, new vote-denial 
issues—such as felon disenfranchisement—are ripe for constitutional 
treatment that explores the nexus of First Amendment and equal 
protection concerns when viewpoint discrimination is suspected. 
Moreover, because the right to vote is itself a legal construct and is not 
expressly granted in the Constitution, the ―Court is forced to formulate 
its own conception of the values served by the right to vote.‖231 The 
concept of voting as speech or expressive conduct is nonetheless 
surprisingly underdeveloped.
232 
 
Of the existing constitutional constructs of expressive conduct, 
voting fits most squarely within the concept of political speech.
233
 If 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See Elora Mukherjee, Abolishing the Time Tax on Voting, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
177, 213–14 (2009) (―Perhaps the connection between the right to vote and the First 
Amendment is strongest in the context of ballot access cases.‖). 
 229. Justice John Paul Stevens made this point in his dissent in Citizens United v. FEC, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.52 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Of course, voting is not speech in a 
pure or formal sense, but then again neither is a campaign expenditure; both are nevertheless 
communicative acts aimed at influencing electoral outcomes.‖). 
 230. Mukherjee, supra note 228, at 213 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 78–
88 (1983)). 
231. Winkler, supra note 115, at 334. 
 232. Professor Pamela Karlan has done the most work to advance the discussion of the 
purpose and function of voting. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism 
About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709–19 (1993) (describing three distinct conceptions 
of voting within the broad right to vote); see also Winkler, supra note 115, at 333 (―[V]oting, 
like other forms of expression, may be understood to have two roles: it may be used as a vehicle 
or tool for communicating ideas (an ‗instrumental‘ role), and it may be used to exert and shape 
one‘s identity without any corresponding desire to convey messages (a ‗constitutive‘ role).‖). 
 233. Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301, 304, 306 (1992) 
(―[T]he First Amendment is principally about political deliberation. . . . [We should] treat 
speech as political when it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation 
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speech is to inform the vote, it follows that the right to vote—the 
culmination of listening and expression—is itself speech or expression. 
In fact, voting reifies these inputs; it is through the act of voting that 
citizens manifest their opinions, ideas, and hopes for governance.
234
 
Meiklejohn is again instructive on this point:  
The First Amendment . . . protects the freedom of those 
activities of thought and communication by which we 
―govern.‖ . . . . But . . . voting is merely the external 
expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by 
means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities 
of making judgments, which that freedom to govern lays 
upon them. . . . Self-government can exist only insofar as 
the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and 
generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, 
casting a ballot is assumed to express.
235 
 
Moreover, where speech is part of ―public discourse‖—that is, when 
it is ―deemed necessary to forge a common democratic will‖—First 
Amendment protection serves the broader goal of democratic 
legitimacy.
236
 
Regardless of whether one accepts the assertion that voting 
constitutes speech and expression as defined within First Amendment 
jurisprudence,
237
 there are sufficient similarities between (1) voting and 
                                                                                                                     
about some issue. . . . Restrictions on political speech have the distinctive feature of impairing 
the ordinary channels for political change . . . . [G]overnment should be under a special burden 
of justification when it seeks to control speech intended and received as a contribution to public 
deliberation.‖); Winkler, supra note 115, at 334 (―[C]onceptualized under the constitutional 
doctrine of free speech, voting would be paradigmatic of political speech . . . .‖); see also Cass 
R. Sunstein, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). 
 234. Winkler, supra note 115, at 334. But see Winkler, supra note 115, at 338 (―[E]ven 
understood to have expressive components, voting is but a muted and limited form of speech 
with a confined range of expressions available to the voter.‖). 
 235. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
255–57 (1961).  
 236. Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 169, 176 (2007); see also Post, supra note 36, at 483, 484 (―Public discourse is 
presumptively within the scope of the First Amendment. . . . All citizens within public 
discourse, and their audiences within public discourse, have equal autonomy [to engage in the 
formation of public opinion], which reflects the political equality that all citizens enjoy within a 
democracy.‖). 
 237. Arguments abound as to why voting should or should not be considered speech or 
expression. For a thorough disquisition of voting‘s traits as expressive activity, see, for example, 
Winkler, supra note 115, at 333, 338–49 (―Voting is essentially an expressive exercise. By 
voting, the individual shows something of herself, displaying desires, beliefs, judgments, and 
perceptions. The voter gives voice to her sentiments and views, concretizes them, and asserts 
them, though anonymously, through the marking of a candidate‘s name or the ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ of a 
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(2) traditional speech and expressive activities to warrant application of 
First Amendment Equal Protection. Furthermore, under the theory of 
―electoral exceptionalism,‖ activity in the electoral context—especially 
voting—deserves special protection and differentiated regulation.238  
B.  Confronting Precedent: The Importance of Ramirez and Hunter 
Despite the racially disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement 
laws, as well as the Voting Rights Act‘s broad prohibition on all voting 
practices that result in denial or abridgement of voting rights on account 
of race,
239
 most challenges to felon disenfranchisement under the Act 
have failed. To date, Ramirez‘s sanction of felon disenfranchisement 
has made it statutorily unassailable. In addition, direct constitutional 
attacks on felon disenfranchisement laws based on the unequal 
treatment of citizens with criminal convictions are directly precluded by 
Ramirez.  
A handful of felon disenfranchisement cases have raised First 
Amendment challenges, which courts have routinely dismissed with 
virtually no analysis on the ground that the First Amendment does not 
provide a right to vote for citizens with felony convictions.
240
 The 
                                                                                                                     
referendum. This may be a communicative effort, one that creates a link between the voter and 
someone else—for example, government officials, political parties, or the general public—and 
passes a message from one to the other.‖). 
 238. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 560 (1964) (―No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as 
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that 
unnecessarily abridges this right.‖ (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964))). 
Voting is also a dimension of citizenship. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Law, and the 
American Nation, 7 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 595, 597–98 (2000) (―Voting, of course, is not 
primarily the power to affect choices of the public officeholders and public policies; it is the 
preeminent expression of citizenship, of identity as an equal member of the national 
community.‖) (citation omitted); see also supra note 45. 
 239. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (prohibiting any ―voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color‖). 
 240. See Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished) (per curiam) (―The First Amendment creates no private right of action for seeking 
reinstatement of previously canceled voting rights. Therefore, the district court correctly 
dismissed Howard‘s claim to the extent it was founded upon the First Amendment.‖); Lawrie v. 
Harris, 2011 WL 3501000, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (―The First Amendment does not 
guarantee felons the right to vote.‖); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 CIV. 8586 (LMM), 2004 WL 
1335921, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004), aff’d and remanded, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006), and 
aff’d and remanded sub nom. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010) (―[T]he case law 
is clear that the First Amendment does not guarantee felons the right to vote.‖); Johnson v. 
Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (―[I]t is clear that the First Amendment does 
not guarantee felons the right to vote.‖); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. 
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district court in Farrakhan v. Locke gave this issue the most detailed 
treatment in its single-sentence holding: ―[T]o uphold these claims 
against Defendants‘ motion to dismiss, the Court would have to 
conclude that the same Constitution that recognizes felon 
disenfranchisement under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
prohibits disenfranchisement under other amendments.‖241 However, 
the Farrakhan court‘s invocation of the Ramirez rationale for 
jettisoning the First Amendment challenge to Washington State‘s felon 
disenfranchisement laws was misplaced. As Hunter demonstrated, 
Ramirez did not foreclose all constitutional challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement laws. Indeed, Ramirez does not preclude 
constitutional claims that do not challenge states‘ general authority to 
enact felon disenfranchisement pursuant to the Court‘s reading of 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carrington and its progeny 
provide the basis for such a claim in the form of viewpoint 
discrimination. To consider how viewpoint discrimination can inform 
an equal protection challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws, it is 
helpful to understand the speech implications of voting, as well as how 
and the extent to which the Ramirez decision informs new constitutional 
challenges. 
In applying Ramirez, courts have repeatedly held that, absent proof 
of intentional racial discrimination in the enactment of the statute, states 
enjoy a blanket sanction to disenfranchise persons with criminal 
convictions because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
text acknowledging the extant practice.
242
 Indeed, felon 
disenfranchisement laws have enjoyed special protection from 
constitutional scrutiny under Ramirez based on the Court‘s textual 
reading of Sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
243
 This 
                                                                                                                     
Wash. 1997) (finding that to hold the same Constitution that specifically recognizes felon 
disenfranchisement under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits 
disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the Constitution in an 
inconsistent manner). But see Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1966) abrogated by 
Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199 (1973) (―While the right to vote is not among the specifically 
enumerated rights of the First Amendment, it is nevertheless one which ‗this (Supreme) Court 
has been so zealous to protect.‘‖) (citing Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96). 
 241. Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314. 
 242. See supra Section III.A; see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974); 
Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1338; Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314. 
 243. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54–55 (―We hold that the understanding of those who 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the 
historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment‘s applicability to state laws 
disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those 
other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause by this Court. . . . [T]hat § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been 
meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less 
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rationale suggests that the constitutional recognition of a practice 
confers impermeable constitutional protection. Alternatively, courts 
have used the justification that the framers did not expressly ban states 
from disenfranchising felons.
244 
While the Court has recognized 
intentional racial discrimination as one impermissible justification for 
such laws,
245
 viewpoint discrimination has not yet been asserted as a 
basis for challenging felon disenfranchisement statutes despite some 
scholarly recognition of this claim.
246
 
As noted above, Ramirez held that denying citizens with felony 
convictions voting rights is not an equal protection violation because 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment references and, therefore, 
permits this practice.
247
 However, as Hunter v. Underwood instructs, 
Ramirez does not control the interpretation of Section 2 when that 
clause competes with other constitutional rights.  
Eleven years after deciding Ramirez, in Hunter, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny to Alabama‘s felon disenfranchisement scheme and held 
it unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
248
 Without 
disturbing its earlier holding that Section 2 implicitly authorizes states 
to deny the vote to citizens with felony convictions, the Court stated, 
―We are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful 
racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of 
[Alabama‘s felon disenfranchisement law] which otherwise violates § 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in [Ramirez] 
                                                                                                                     
drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of 
disenfranchisement.‖). 
 244. See id. at 43; Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1338; Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314. 
 245. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 225 (1985). Hunter relied on both the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments for its holding, which allowed the Court to avoid the argument that 
the acknowledgment of the practice contained in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment could 
not have been outlawed by Section 1. Accepting this interpretation, arguendo, still leaves other 
constitutional provisions to be tested against Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
extent that they are in tension. 
 246. Indeed, the assertion that felon disenfranchisement laws operate as a form of 
viewpoint discrimination does not originate with this Article. Pamela Karlan and others have 
drawn the connection between the group of cases that prohibit vote denial that is based on how 
one might vote and the justifications for felon disenfranchisement. See Karlan, Convictions and 
Doubts, supra note 50 (discussing causes and consequences of various approaches to felon 
disenfranchisement); see also Figler, supra note 84, at 733–35; Wilkins, supra note 78, at 108–
09. 
247. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts, supra note 50, at 1153–54. 
 248. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225, 233 (applying Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 
U.S. 252, 265 (1977); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626–30 (1969) 
(detailing the reasons for applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on the right to vote); Otsuka v. 
Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416–18 (applying strict scrutiny to vote denial claim). 
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suggests the contrary.‖249 Hunter‘s challenge to discrimination in the 
enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws thus demonstrates that, 
where specific constitutional protections are threatened, felon 
disenfranchisement statutes are not immune to challenge.  
Accordingly, a viewpoint-based First Amendment Equal Protection 
challenge does not contravene the Court‘s holding in Ramirez. Such a 
challenge is consistent with Hunter‘s application of strict scrutiny to 
these laws when the equality protections of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are threatened. Certainly, nothing in a First Amendment 
viewpoint discrimination challenge upsets the precedent in Ramirez or 
earlier vote denial cases that ―[r]esidence requirements, age, [and] 
previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors which 
a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of 
voters.‖250 Rather, a viewpoint discrimination challenge pits the First 
Amendment‘s freedom of expression protection and the Equal 
Protection Clause‘s fundamental rights jurisprudence against Ramirez‘s 
license to lawfully disenfranchise citizens with felony convictions.
251 
 
In determining the constitutionality of the statute, the Hunter Court 
took account of the legislative record that demonstrated discriminatory 
intent,
252
 as well as the racially disproportionate impact of Alabama‘s 
racially neutral disenfranchising provisions. Specifically, the Court 
noted that, as of 1903, the statute had disenfranchised approximately ten 
times as many blacks as whites, and that at the time of the decision a 
disparate effect persisted to such an extent that in Jefferson and 
Montgomery Counties, African-Americans were at least 1.7 times as 
likely as whites to be disenfranchised by the statute.
253
 Significantly, 
Hunter was also a mixed-motive case. The state proffered a defense that 
the intent of the law was not only to disenfranchise blacks, but also to 
disenfranchise poor whites.
254
 Without deciding ―[w]hether or not 
                                                                                                                     
 249. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233; see also Ortiz, supra note 162, at 1131 (―Even though the 
state argued that the fourteenth amendment itself expressly contemplated such exclusions, the 
inference of intent proved unrebuttable.‖). 
 250. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton 
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)) (internal citations omitted). 
 251. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (―[W]here fundamental 
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might 
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.‖ (citing Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966); 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 580–81 (1965) 
(Black, J., concurring)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 561–62 (1964). 
 252. The Court found undisputed evidence that a ―zeal for white supremacy ran rampant at 
the convention‖ at which Alabama‘s felon disfranchisement laws were enacted. Hunter, 471 
U.S. at 229. 
 253. Id. at 227. 
254. Id. at 232. 
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intentional disenfranchisement of poor whites would qualify as a 
‗permissible motive‘ . . . [the Court held that] an additional purpose to 
discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose 
to discriminate against all blacks‖ where racial discrimination was a 
―but-for‖ motivation.255 
While Ramirez is a formidable barrier to general equal protection 
claims, it does not bar equal protection or other constitutional 
challenges that are based on suspect classifications or, as this Article 
suggests, independent constitutional principles such as viewpoint 
discrimination.  
C.  First Amendment Lessons from Partisan Gerrymandering 
The judicial theory of viewpoint discrimination set forth above 
indicates that the Court has applied First Amendment principles in vote 
denial cases. These cases do not, however, reflect the Court‘s thinking 
on applying the First Amendment in such cases. On the other hand, in 
the realm of partisan redistricting, certain members of the Court have 
beckoned the First Amendment to settle what has proved to be a 
theoretically justiciable but practically impossible legal claim.  
The Equal Protection Clause has long defined the jurisprudence 
surrounding constitutional challenges in the area of redistricting. 
Indeed, the one person, one vote cases, grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause, spurred a reapportionment revolution and subsequent 
redistricting phenomenon.
256
 However, there is some acknowledgement 
by the Court that it may not be the only constitutional provision that 
addresses these concerns, especially in the realm of partisan 
gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering, the act of redistricting with 
excessive emphasis on voters‘ party affiliation, invokes viewpoint 
discrimination theory because the motive for manipulating electoral 
lines in the challenged configuration is based on the ideological 
viewpoint of the voters as expressed by their party affiliation.
257
 In 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. 
 256. See Joseph C. Coates, III, Comment, The Court Confronts the Gerrymander, 15 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 351, 352 (1987) (―The apportionment revolution began with the United States 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Baker v. Carr, holding that malapportionment was a justiciable 
issue.‖) (footnote omitted, discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); see also Reynolds, 
377 U.S. at 568 (―We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis.‖). 
 257. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 314 (2004) (―The First Amendment may 
be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering. After all, these allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not 
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their 
voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political views.‖). 
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Vieth v. Jubelier
258
 and League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) v. Perry,
259
 the Court briefly explored the First Amendment‘s 
application in partisan gerrymandering cases. Vieth established that 
voters affiliated with a political party can sue to block implementation 
of a congressional redistricting plan on the grounds that it was 
manipulated for purely political reasons, but the Court found no 
violation on these grounds based on the case‘s facts. Instead, the Court 
held that the Pennsylvania congressional plan created by the 
Republican-led legislature violated the principle of one person, one 
vote.  
Among Vieth‘s highly fractured opinions, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
wrote that ―First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law 
that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their 
party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views.‖260 In such cases, 
he argued, strict scrutiny must be applied because of the burden the state 
places on representational rights and the state‘s consideration of 
political views.
261
 Absent a narrowly tailored compelling government 
interest, these laws would fail.
262
  
Justice Kennedy further noted that ―[t]he First Amendment may be 
the more relevant constitutional provision‖263 in gerrymandering cases 
because of the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause‘s 
classification-focused approach in contexts beyond race: The Equal 
Protection Clause analysis ―presents a more complicated question when 
the inquiry is whether a generally permissible classification has been 
used for an impermissible purpose. That question can only be answered 
in the affirmative by the subsidiary showing that the classification as 
applied imposes unlawful burdens.‖264 To be sure, rather than focusing 
on the permissibility of the voter classification according to equal 
protection jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy‘s First Amendment approach 
would consider the extent of the burden on representational rights.
265
 
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in Vieth, which provided the fifth vote for 
the judgment, therefore marks an important development in recognizing 
                                                                                                                     
 258. Id. 
 259. 548 U.S. 399, 461–62 (2006). 
 260. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id.  
 263. Id.  
 264. Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 265. Id. Justice Kennedy did not define representational rights for these purposes. See, e.g., 
ISSACHAROFF & KARLAN, supra note 132, at 564 (critiquing Justice Stevens‘s hybrid approach 
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the interrelation of First Amendment principles and equal protection 
claims in election law. 
Justice John Paul Stevens joined Justice Kennedy‘s endorsement of a 
First Amendment approach to partisan gerrymandering in Vieth and 
continued developing this idea in the vein of political neutrality in 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.
266
 LULAC 
involved the infamous mid-decade redistricting of Texas congressional 
seats at the behest of Representative Tom Delay, which sent Democratic 
legislators fleeing from the state to prevent quorum. There the Court 
held 7–2 that the resulting plan (for the entire state and the Dallas area) 
was not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and that states could 
redistrict mid-decade as appropriate.
267
 In addition, however, the Court 
held 5–4 that the state‘s dismantling of one majority-minority district 
(District 23), as it was positioned to oust an incumbent, denied those 
voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in violation of 
the Voting Rights Act.
268
 Justice Stevens‘s concurrence and dissent in 
LULAC briefly developed Justice Kennedy‘s First Amendment overture 
from Vieth, but took it one step further by joining the Equal Protection 
Clause and First Amendment analyses:  
The requirements of the Federal Constitution that limit the 
State‘s power to rely exclusively on partisan preferences in 
drawing district lines are the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
prohibition against invidious discrimination, and the First 
Amendment‘s protection of citizens from official retaliation 
based on their political affiliation. The equal protection 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment requires actions 
taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legitimate 
interest, and further establishes that a bare desire to harm a 
politically disfavored group is not a legitimate interest. 
Similarly, the freedom of political belief and association 
guaranteed by the First Amendment prevents the State, 
absent a compelling interest, from ‗penalizing citizens 
because of their participation in the electoral 
process, . . . their association with a political party, or their 
expression of political views.‘269 
 
                                                                                                                     
 266. 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 427. The Court, though, failed to hold that an African-American plurality district 
and another potential Latino district were protected under the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 425. 
 269. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
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Justice Stevens‘s approach broadens the analysis to include the 
state‘s motivations in burdening voters‘ rights.270 Among the 
impermissible motivations or justifications are exclusionary reasons—
reasons that ―are simply excluded from being acceptable bases for 
action.‖271 Writing for the majority in LULAC, Justice Kennedy also 
echoed these sentiments. He noted that ―even if . . . the State‘s action 
was taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons,‖272 that does not 
change the constitutional analysis. Indeed, one possible reading of 
Justice Kennedy‘s First Amendment Equal Protection approach to 
partisan gerrymandering is that it is a limitation on a state‘s ability to 
infringe voting rights for a constitutionally impermissible reason.
273 
These reasons do not need to be based on a racial classification and, 
importantly, can be based on a lawful classification. Rather, the inquiry 
is ―whether a generally permissible classification has been used for an 
impermissible purpose.‖274 Justice Kennedy‘s conclusion that the Texas 
legislature‘s dismantling of a majority Latino district because Latinos 
were poised to avail themselves of the opportunity to elect a candidate 
of their choice ―bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could 
give rise to an equal protection violation‖ underscores this point.275 The 
Latino voters in LULAC were denied certain rights of representation 
based on how they intended to exercise the right to vote—that is, based 
on who they intended to vote for.  
It is true that Justice Kennedy‘s approach in Vieth was roundly 
rebuffed by a plurality of the Court in Vieth,
276
 and Justice Stevens‘s 
suggested hybrid equal protection–First Amendment analysis has not 
been developed further. Still, Vieth and LULAC demonstrate that the 
connection between the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause in the realm of election law has not been lost on all members of 
the Court. Some election law scholars have taken up the mantle of 
pursuing the First Amendment‘s applicability to partisan 
                                                                                                                     
 270. See Charles, supra note 265, at 1201 (―LULAC adds an additional element into the 
inquiry: the justification for the classification. The inquiry is not only whether a permissible 
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 273. Charles, supra note 265, at 1196–202. 
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gerrymandering
277
 amid broad criticism of applying the First 
Amendment to such claims.
278 
However, the principal critique of Justice 
Kennedy‘s approach, in most instances, is directly linked to the vagaries 
of redistricting and the difficulty in discerning motive among all the 
other factors that contribute to redistricting.
279
 This problem is less 
pronounced concerning felon disenfranchisement and far more 
remediable. When enacting felon disenfranchisement laws, legislatures 
are certainly considering many factors; however, the universe of 
justifications is much smaller. If potential voters are denied the 
franchise because of the viewpoint they are expected to express at the 
polls, then the law is suspect even though the legislature‘s motive may 
be mixed with other rationales.
280 
Whether any consideration—or the 
extent of consideration—of viewpoint in the context of redistricting is 
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation is still a perplexing 
matter for the Court; one that is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Suffice it to say, however, that viewing First Amendment principles as 
applicable to gerrymandering (as Justices Kennedy and Stevens do) 
makes it easier to view First Amendment principles as applicable to 
vote denial cases such as felon disenfranchisement.  
Moreover, finding a viewpoint discrimination connection to felon 
disenfranchisement laws would not upend legislative practices as it 
would with those in the context of partisan redistricting. Unlike the 
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gerrymandering.‖). 
 280. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 232 (1985) (―Whether or not intentional 
disenfranchisement of poor whites would qualify as a ‗permissible motive‘ . . . it is clear that 
where both impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact are 
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enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws, in the course of 
redistricting, legislatures must balance numerous interests and concerns 
while abiding by traditional redistricting criteria, including incumbency 
protection, which naturally invites consideration of voters‘ party 
affiliation.
281 
By contrast, the perceived viewpoint of the voter is 
entirely irrelevant to the right to vote and should never play a role in 
determining voter eligibility.  
With respect to partisan gerrymandering, one scholar has noted that 
―[t]he question for the Court‘s gerrymandering jurisprudence is whether 
there are limitations on a State‘s ability to alter electoral structures when 
voter preferences are inimical to the state‘s preferences. What is the 
purpose of elections if a state will repeatedly seek to impose its 
preferences on the electoral process?‖282 Similar questions remain for 
felon disenfranchisement. Will the Court permit states to alter the 
composition of their electorates when that action is motivated by a 
desire to exclude a group of citizens based on how they may vote? Will 
this unlawfully diminish the purpose and integrity of elections?  
CONCLUSION 
Of the U.S. Constitution‘s twenty-seven amendments, five expand 
the right to vote to include groups of citizens that were once denied that 
right for what would now be considered discriminatory purposes.
283
 
Some groups once considered ―unpopular‖ under the law were denied 
the right to vote based on the same moralistic and functional 
justifications that are today used to defend felon disenfranchisement. It 
is well-established that Ramirez permits intentional discrimination 
against citizens with felony convictions, in the form of vote denial, 
because of their status as felons. It stretches Ramirez‘s holding beyond 
constitutional limits, though, to interpret it to permit intentional 
discrimination in the form of vote denial because of how felons may 
                                                                                                                     
 281. As long as incumbency protection is a legitimate redistricting criterion, party 
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vote. 
As the development of election law directs us toward more nuanced 
conceptions of equality in the political arena, the justifications for felon 
disenfranchisement laws—especially when viewed in the context of 
their impact on racial minorities and poor populations—weaken 
significantly. Because there is no ―organizing principle to ‗the law of 
politics,‘‖284 cross-pollination between substantively related doctrines 
like the First Amendment and Equal Protection can inform the 
protection of the right to vote against various forms of discrimination, 
even those society is not yet willing to recognize. Indeed, if we take 
seriously Justice William O. Douglas‘s trenchant pronouncement that 
―the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a 
particular era,‖285 then expanding current conceptions of the Clause‘s 
interaction with other fundamental rights is appropriate.
286
 The opinion 
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, from which this observation 
originates, further counsels that ―[n]otions of what constitutes equal 
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change,‖ 
especially concerning the protection of fundamental rights.
287
 This is 
particularly true concerning groups that have been disfavored or 
discriminated against historically. Undeniably, the central lesson of the 
century-plus struggle toward universal suffrage, and the expansion of 
constitutional protections more generally, is that ―an understanding of 
our Constitution, for our Constitution will be tested again and again by 
unpopular people and unpopular causes.‖288 Applying First Amendment 
Equal Protection to felon disenfranchisement laws that are grounded in 
viewpoint discrimination meets this challenge by safeguarding and 
connecting the principles of equality in the constitutional provisions 
where they are valued most. 
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